Warm reminder from FT中文网: If you are interested in the content of FT中文网, please search for “FT中文网” in the Apple App Store or Huawei App Market, download the official application of FT中文网, and pay for subscription. I wish you a happy use!
Tsai Ing-wen’s speech on cross-strait relations in the “Double Ten” commemorative speech delivered last Sunday has become the focus of discussions in overseas Chinese media this week; and it is reported that the US government has also kept a close eye on this.
Mainland China this Wednesday (October 13) denounced Tsai Ing-wen’s speech as “naked” trafficking in the “two-state theory”, but the impact of the matter may be far more than that simple, because it not only gives the DPP exclusive control over it. The right to interpret cross-strait relations has also become active on the island, and it is more likely that there will be no “1992 consensus” between the two sides of the strait; mainland China must face this new situation.
The “92 Consensus” has been torn apart
Tsai Ing-wen’s speech on “Double Ten” mentioned that Taiwan has “four persistences” in cross-strait relations: adhere to a free and democratic “constitutional government” system; insist that the “Republic of China” and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other; insist on “intolerance of sovereignty” Encroachment and annexation”; the future of “Taiwan, the Republic of China” must follow the will of all Taiwanese people. In this way, the “92 Consensus” has been completely torn apart, and it is very likely that there will be no “92 Consensus” on both sides of the strait in the future.
The reason for this is that Tsai Ing-wen’s formulation of the “four persistences” completely undermines the premise of the existence of the “92 Consensus,” which is the obscure interpretation of the meaning of “one China”. According to the agreement reached between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party that year, the original text of the “92 Consensus” is: “In the process of working together across the Taiwan Straits to seek national reunification, although both sides adhere to the one-China principle, they have their own understanding of the meaning of one China. Different.” Because of this, the mainland’s interpretation of the “92 Consensus” is “one China”; while the Kuomintang’s interpretation is “one China, each table”, that is, “one China, each statement”, and the mainland’s “one China” interpretation. “China” is the People’s Republic of China, and the “One China” of the Kuomintang is the “Republic of China”, and is based on the “Republic of China Constitution”. In this way, this ambiguity provides both sides with room for interpretation. However, Tsai Ing-wen’s speech made the meaning of “one China” publicly clear, namely: “Taiwan, Republic of China.” Tsai Ing-wen’s interpretation actually violates the narrative in the “Constitution of the Republic of China” on the “land of the Republic of China”, that is, the territory of the “Republic of China” includes the Taiwan Peng, Jinma, Mainland China, and Mongolia-Tibet regions. Although this narrative does not conform to mainland law, the mainland has tacitly accepted the “one China” principle embodied in this “constitution” in practice. Mainland China must not agree with Tsai Ing-wen’s concept of “Taiwan of the Republic of China” because according to the logic of the mainland: the constitutional provisions advocating the “Republic of China” are “One China”, while Tsai Ing-wen’s interpretation limits the “Taiwan of the Republic of China” to Taiwan. Golden Horse, this is tantamount to “two Chinas”, and the “92 Consensus” has been publicly torn apart. This is the “two-state theory.”
But the problem is that Tsai Ing-wen’s interpretation of the “Republic of China” is a reality in Taiwan, and Taiwan’s political parties and Taiwan society generally agree. In fact, even the Kuomintang holds such propositions. The Kuomintang’s customary approach when in power was: the mainland did not put pressure on the issue of reunification, and the Kuomintang remained silent; when the mainland talked about reunification, the Kuomintang used the “Republic of China” and the “Three People’s Principles to reunify China” as weapons to fight. Moreover, the “Mainland China” when the Kuomintang was in power has stated more than once in the past: “Taiwan has never been part of the People’s Republic of China.” From this, we can see the deep-seated problems between the two sides of the strait. It is precisely because of this that Tsai Ing-wen asked the chairman of the Kuomintang and other major political parties in Taiwan to mutually agree on this and not to breach the contract, and claimed that her “four insistences” are “the bottom line given to us by the people of Taiwan.” So much so that major political parties such as the Kuomintang could not refute it. In cross-strait relations, the DPP has actually seized the first opportunity in island politics.
For the mainland, the consequences of Tsai Ing-wen’s actions are quite troublesome, because a careful analysis of her remarks will reveal that Tsai Ing-wen’s behavior patterns in cross-strait relations have begun to change a lot: first, she embraces the “Republic of China”, in terms of legal principles. This is close to returning to the First China and abandoning Taiwan independence. This is her strategy; emphasizing “non-submission to each other” and “Republic of China Taiwan” reflects the reality of the two sides of the strait, but it is one step closer than the KMT’s “one China, each table.” The most powerful thing is that she captured the vast majority of public opinion on the island. Even the Kuomintang chairman Zhu Lilun who was present was unable to directly refute Tsai Ing-wen’s statement itself, and it would be difficult for the Kuomintang to break through this framework in the future.
How will the two sides of the strait be reunified
Faced with the new expressions of Taiwan’s Tsai Ing-wen authorities, the issue of cross-strait reunification may become more complicated. But the author believes that if there is real sincerity, it is not impossible to solve it, but there is the following path:
The mainland used force to unify Taiwan. But the consequences of this approach are unpredictable. First, it is unpredictable whether the United States and the Western world will directly intervene, and second, even if reunification is achieved, the sequelae will be very serious. Therefore, the Chinese leader said in his speech to commemorate the Revolution of 1911: Peaceful reunification best meets the aspirations of the people on both sides of the strait.
It is difficult for the people of Taiwan to accept the peaceful reunification of Hong Kong under the “one country, two systems” model. In fact, there are still many problems in Hong Kong that have not yet been resolved. Western governments and people have always regarded them as a problem.
In this way, we must consider the issue of changing the state system, that is, as China with a tradition of thousands of years of great unification, can it engage in federalism?
In fact, Lien Chan raised this question to the mainland leaders when he first visited the mainland. Moreover, many large countries in the world have implemented and are implementing a federal system. For example, the former Soviet Union and the current United States, that is, diplomacy and defense are controlled by the central government, and other management methods can implement local autonomy. As far as Taiwan is concerned, when dealing with some foreign affairs involving Taiwan itself, it can also be discussed that the central government and Taiwan should jointly negotiate and implement, especially foreign-related economic affairs. After all, Taiwan is an independent tariff in many international economic organizations such as the WTO. The district is an independent unit.
In fact, in the Deng Xiaoping era, this model of placing Taiwan’s diplomacy and national defense under the central management and other implementation of local autonomy was discussed. However, in the context of no legal changes in the state system, the persuasiveness of the people in Taiwan is not strong. Now that the historical background is different, can we explore the changes in the state system?
Also, if Taiwan returns, can China’s country name be changed? After all, this involves major political issues. The author believes that compared with cross-strait reunification, this is a detailed problem; as long as there is sincerity in solving the problem, it should not be difficult to do so.
(Note: The author is the secretary-general of the International Public Opinion Research Center of the Chahar Society and a researcher of the Peninsula Peace Research Center. This article only represents the author’s personal views. The editor’s mailbox [email protected])