The Taliban are losing interest in maintaining a relationship with the US and are aiming for the reconstruction of the Islamic Emirate. Just a few months ago they were discussing the compromises that would be necessary to reach an agreement with the political elites in Kabul: the interim government ventilated by the special envoy from Washington Zalmay Khalilzad and by the secretary of state Antony Blink it was supposed to preside over negotiations aimed at leading to the formation of a hybrid executive, combining elements of the Emirate and the Islamic Republic. Those days seem distant today. In fact, the Taliban think that complex negotiations on future political-institutional architectures are not necessary.
Despite the conciliatory approach shown in Kabul, they are moving towards the proclamation of the second Emirate, according to various sources, not only among the Taliban but also among their interlocutors in other countries and in Iran. They intend to keep the political system as it is, but to superimpose on it a “guiding council”, at the head of which will sit their supreme leader. One of the three deputies, probably Baradar, will thus be appointed president. This may be a temporary solution but there are no others on the table at the moment.
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The reasons for this shift in the direction of continuity with respect to the regime of mullah Omar they are mainly two: the desire to maximize control of the country, to contain the incipient chaos, and the perception that the dissolution of the Islamic Republic proves the low weight of its elites.
Overall, according to a source within the Taliban, the “allies” among the former of the Islamic Republic will receive only 15% of all positions of power. Taliban sources speak vaguely of the “freedom” that groups of old mujahideen of the 1980s will enjoy in the new system and the respect the Taliban will show for their property and their loyalists. It is not clear, however, how the old mujahideen can put these freedoms to good use in the absence of elections.
For years, the Taliban have debated the eligibility of elections in Islam and have come to mostly favorable conclusions, under certain conditions. In fact, consensus was forming towards an Iranian-type electoral model. Now, however, elections are no longer talked about. In public, the representatives of the Taliban make it clear that they do not intend to establish a democratic system. In itself this does not mean much, because if the Taliban decided to hold elections they would not use the abhorred “colonial” term of “democracy”. However, the fact that the Taliban are not trying to reassure the political elites with promises of elections suggests that the issue has been shelved for now.
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The Taliban don’t have much incentive to develop some kind of electoral system. Much of the Afghan population had long been disillusioned with the democracy brought by the Americans. It is not even clear whether Kabul’s political elites, especially those of ethnic minorities, raised the “democratic question” in their talks with the Taliban. The Taliban seem to focus on the economic interests of the oligarchy created by the Bonn agreement and consolidated with the first two mandates of Hamid Karzai. To varying degrees, the members of the political elite have accumulated, through various trafficking and appropriations, fortunes that may be very large. Much of these fortunes are invested in real estate distributed in Afghan cities. The Taliban’s calculation is that in order to remain in control of their investments, the oligarchs will be content with the crumbs of political power. The Taliban are hoping for Chinese investments, while Iran has promised aid, despite its weak finances. It is not excluded that Qatar may also contribute. Overall, however, at least in the short term, the new regime will face a large shortage of currency. The oligarchs could therefore contribute to the economic recovery.
On this, the Taliban may well be right. Between Wednesday and Thursday, three prominent members of the political elite came out, declaring their conditional support for the Taliban. Haji Mohaqqeq e Karim Khalili, the two main Hazara leaders, and Salahuddin Rabbani, one of the main Tajik leaders, called for a government that is inclusive and respectful of the rights of the population. The three leaders wrote in a coordinated way from Pakistan, where they have been visiting for a few days.
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Nonetheless, the road is uphill for the Taliban if they persist in concentrating political power in the hands of their leaders. Even if the old oligarchy were to get on the victor’s wagon, it is not automatic that it will be able to take the bulk of the followers with it, especially if, as it is probable, there will not be many spoils to distribute. For now, pockets of active resistance in Panshir (where Vice President Saleh, Ahmad Massud and the Minister of Defense Bismillah Mohammadi have taken refuge) and in the two districts of Behsud (where the commander Hazara Alipoor expressed support for the panshiris) do not seem to worry the Taliban too much, but the scenario of possible resistance is open. The militias that have agreed with the Taliban, however, including those of Rabbani, Khalili and Mohaqqeq, as well as many others, are still armed. Many of the Northeast Taliban are former Rabbani militiamen, who felt marginalized by party leaders. It certainly cannot be ruled out that a similar process of disaffection will repeat itself in the future, this time in the opposite direction.
Furthermore, there are already internal tensions in the movement, after the groups that took control of Kabul (linked to the Haqqani network and other Eastern Taliban groups) prevented groups of Taliban Tajiks from the Northeast from entering armed. Kabul. The Tajik Taliban, always suspicious of the Pashtun Taliban’s tendency to concentrate power in their own hands, have resented and already imagine that in the division of spoils they will be losers. The Taliban masters of blitzkrieg now have to deal with the difficult area of political balancing.
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