A chapter in itself is represented by the hypothesis, formulated by the G7, of a ceiling on the price of Russian oil. The EU could consider the option, on the sidelines of its sanction package, but the leaders reveal a line of caution. The President of the European Council, Charles Michel, said that Brussels will first have to secure the support of “the 27 Member States of the European Union” and avoid a boomerang effect on the EU economy.
The hypothesis of a squeeze on Russian gold
The hypothesis of a squeeze on Russian gold materialized on the eve of the European Council of 23-24 June, as an additional squeeze compared to the six packages launched to date. The indiscretions reported by international agencies, such as Reuters, had highlighted the desire to strike an industry that has a bearing on Moscow’s finances and the stability of a Russian central bank already hit by the freezing of its assets. asset in Europe. According to data from the World Gold Council, highlighted by the Sole 24 Ore, Moscow produces almost 331 tons of gold a year, for a value that is around 15.5 billion US dollars.
The two days ended without specific news, although the 27 included in the communiqué final that “the work on sanctions will continue” until the introduction of new measures. Sanctions on gold could be part of the new rounds of retaliation, all the more so after the metal is – also – in the sights of the G7. At the summit in Bavaria on 25 and 26 June, global leaders discussed stopping gold imports from Moscow, with the aim of penalizing the finances of Moscow and the oligarchs close to Russian President Putin. On this front too, the underlying principle is caution. Michel stressed that the 27 will study the possibility of hitting Russian gold, but always in a way that “hits the Russian economy and not ourselves”.
The (European) taboo on Russian gas imports
The taboo on Russian gas remains standing, one of the most delicate junctions in the economic and energy interdependence between Brussels and Moscow. The EU owes Russia 40% of its gas imports, a quota that has always forced EU leaders to remain more than cautious about any retaliatory measures. The result is that an ad hoc sanction has never appeared in the decisions of the 27, even if the goal of completely freeing themselves from Moscow can only pass through an easing of gas dependence. Meanwhile, the Kremlin has not hesitated to retaliate against it by cutting or scaling its supplies to Europe.
The most drastic move was recorded with the 60% cut in supplies of Nord Stream 1, the main European gas pipeline, the “twin” of Nord Stream 2 blocked by Germany in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine itself. The intervention caused drops in supplies from some EU countries, including Italy, while the taps had already been closed in a targeted manner in Bulgaria, France, Poland and the Netherlands. The scenario that worries the EU leaders most is that of a complete stop of exports in the winter, “the lethal weapon” on an EU economy that has already passed from the Covid crisis to that triggered by the Ukrainian conflict. For now, Brussels seems to rule out the hypothesis, defined as unrealistic and counterproductive even for the Kremlin itself. But it wouldn’t be the first surprise coming from Moscow, even to the detriment of its own economy.