A Russia not too weak, a secondary partner but at the same time solid enough to allow it to point to a reorganization of the world system in version multipole. It’s a balance game that undertaken by Chinese since he decided to intervene more actively in the conflict that erupted on 24 February 2022 at the behest of Vladimir Putin. Before the presentation of 12 princes for lasting peace, today the president’s first trip Xi Jinping in Russia since the beginning of the invasion. But this trip is still far from being decisive for the fate of the conflict: “After the decision to Mosca to launch a new military campaign at the beginning of the year – explains a Ilfattoquotidiano.it Francesco Strazzariprofessor of International Relations at the Scuola Sant’Anna in Pisa – will be difficult to convince United States e Ukraine to accept a simple cease-fire. The work of the People’s Republic will have to be of wide range“. To become the great mediator, it will not be enough for Beijing to keep Vladimir Putin’s Russia alive: he will have to offer an acceptable exit strategy to all the players involved.
However, the meetings of these hours between the Chinese and Russian presidents remain a crucial stage in the normalization process desired primarily by Dragon. This is the first face-to-face confrontation between the two leaders since the start of the Russian invasion, more than a year after the one held on the eve of the Winter Olympicswhen the head of the Kremlin flew to China to collect the promise of a “friendship without limits”. Limits to that friendship, however, do exist. “China – explains Strazzari – has not decided to intervene diplomatically in the conflict out of its own conviction. She was dragged there by one rash move, sudden and perhaps even miscalculated by the Kremlin. But the two countries have very different goals. While Russia, a power in decline, wants to try to replay the lost game of Cold War reaffirming itself as a leading entity on the international scene, the Asian giant wants to achieve a reorganization of the world system that breaks the unipolar scheme imposed by Washington. A goal to be achieved gradually, which war hinders rather than benefits. But Xi Jinping also knows that he cannot achieve it without a system of balances that presupposes a partnership with Fly”.
Beijing arrives at this summit presenting its peace plan to Moscow, but according to Strazzari there are other short-term concerns that beset the People’s Republic: “There is concern for the declining military efficiency of Moscow and the consequent political and economic problems linked to the prolongation of the conflict. China knows it is intervening alongside a partner who is bluffing by saying it is winning, but it cannot do without it for its own objectives by trying to limit the hegemonic ones of the Kremlin”. In the same way, however, Xi Jinping knows that Russia needs Beijing for two reasons: “The first is that the Federation dreams of creating an alliance with China, which Beijing has been careful not to sign, to rebalance the American hegemony. On the other she needs broaden its commercial base getting advanced technologieswhich are becoming increasingly scarce after a heavy year sanctionsin exchange for raw material cheap”.
The People’s Republic, however, is careful not to get excessively involved in the conflict: its goal is and remains to show itself as un’entità super parts able to act as a point of connection between the various souls of the conflict. A goal, however, hindered by the American will. “The United States have every interest in showing a limited role for China – continues Strazzari -, precisely to curb the multipolar reorganization process hoped for by Moscow and Beijing”. And that’s also why the Dragon must put in place a much broader peace plan, acceptable to all the actors involved: “A simple ceasefire is not acceptable even for Kiev – continues the professor -, it would do nothing but give Russia the break which it needs to reorganize itself after an offensive that is not bringing the desired results”. For this reason, China will soon attempt a repositioning: “It must find credibility in Zelensky’s eyes, first of all by making contact with his executive which in recent weeks has shown openness towards the Asian power”. That said, the great American obstacle remains: “The United States, unlike China, already has invested a lotas well as Europein this war. The first for the military supportthe second for the high ones energy costs. Also for this reason, a ceasefire is now not considered acceptable”. This is precisely the effort to which China is called: “One more peace strategy articulated, which offers good reasons to cease hostilities also to the other party, which is in itself reluctant to leave it the role of mediator. In the meantime, it could start by making official contact with the Ukrainian government”.
In short, a game of balances that satisfies everyone and serves the Chinese leadership in pursuing its only objective: “Preventing a destabilization of Russia, while maintaining it a secondary partner able to help it in the reorganization of the world order towards a multipolar structure – concludes Strazzari – You need a minor partner, but one that maintains a certain international weight”.