[Epoch Times, April 5, 2022]40 days after the Russian-Ukrainian war, the Russian army officially gave up attacking Kyiv and began to turn to the eastern region of Ukraine. The Russian army is seeking to cut off the support of eastern Ukraine and surround the resistance forces in eastern Ukraine; the Ukrainian army wants to prevent the Russian army from forming an encirclement in eastern Ukraine, or counter-encircle the Russian army trying to go south. This is probably the next evolution of the Russian-Ukrainian war, and at the same time there may be a big fight in southern Ukraine.
Russian troops have withdrawn
On April 4, the US Department of Defense issued a press release, “Russians Retreating From Around Kyiv, Refitting in Belarus.” The press release confirmed that two-thirds of the Russian troops who had invaded Kyiv from the north had retreated to Belarus. U.S. Defense Department officials estimated the total size of the Russian military to be roughly 20 battalion-level combat units. This means that 13-14 units have been withdrawn from Ukraine, and 6-7 units have not been withdrawn.
Think tank ISW believes that these forces are badly damaged and need to be restructured and replenished. When the Russian army withdrew, they laid a large number of mines and carried out cover artillery fire to prevent the pursuit of the Ukrainian army. This may indicate that it is difficult for the Russian army to kill a carbine again in the short term, otherwise it will fall into its own minefield; and after these troops suffer losses, it will be difficult to capture Kyiv again.
The battalion-level tactical unit of the Russian army should be 600-800 people, and the total number of 20 units should be about 12-16,000 people. The Russian army has also tried to form a siege from the east side of Kyiv, and the deployed force is estimated to be less than 20 battalion-level tactical units. The U.S. Department of Defense estimates that a total of 120 battalion-level tactical units of the Russian army invaded Ukraine. I am afraid that less than one-third of the battalion-level tactical units will be surrounded by Kyiv. and southern Ukraine.
The Russian army tried to capture Kyiv with a front-line offensive force of more than 30,000 people, which should have assumed that the Ukrainian army would collapse at a touch. It turned out that the plans of the Russian General Staff were completely wrong. After 40 days, the Russian army was forced to give up attacking Kyiv, and the action was quite rapid. In the end, there was not even a large-scale artillery attack on Kiev, indicating that the Russian army was more worried about whether it could be safely evacuated, and more people might not want to fight again.
The original Russian troops on the eastern side of Ukraine also quickly retreated. At present, it is not known how long it will take for these tens of thousands of Russian troops to reorganize and renovate, and which front they may be put into.
After Kyiv is cleared, Ukraine can leave paramilitary forces on guard, and some field troops in and around the city, as well as reserves in western Ukraine, should be able to move to the eastern or southern fronts.
Is the Russian Army capable of tying pockets?
At the same time as the Russian army withdrew from Kyiv, it should also give up the siege of Kharkiv, the second largest city in Ukraine. The surrounding troops are likely to move to the southeast, trying to isolate the Ukrainian army that is currently resisting in the east, and cut off the support from the Ukrainian army from the west. And the supply channel, surrounded and swallowed the Ukrainian army in the east.
This should be the next combat goal of the Russian army, which can not only quickly annex the entire Donbas region of eastern Ukrainian, but also possibly encircle and wipe out part of the Ukrainian army. Russian high-level officials probably need such a victory to explain something to Russia, and the Russian army can save some face. The question is whether the Russian army has the ability to tie a pocket.
The troops currently deployed by the Russian army around Kharkov may not be able to handle such a large-scale assault. It is likely that the Russian army that has withdrawn into Belarus will be reorganized and reinforced as soon as possible; otherwise, the Russian army may not only be unable to complete the task of tying the pockets. , the troops that are too advanced may also be divided by the Ukrainian army and fall into the risk of partial encirclement. The Ukrainian army should also launch a counterattack from near Kharkov, interfering with the Russian army’s supply line, making it difficult for the Russian army to care.
The Russian army has occupied Izium and is trying to move south, and the Ukrainian army is also trying to stop it. The Ukrainian army’s original tactics of ambush warfare may gradually turn to mobile warfare; it used to be able to wait for work and choose the best ambush location, but now it may have to maneuver on a large scale, quickly enter the position, and there may be unexpected encounters; It used to be mainly small-scale guerrilla warfare, but now it may be necessary to organize different troops to conduct coordinated offensive and defensive warfare. This is undoubtedly a new test for the Ukrainian army. Real-time U.S. intelligence becomes more critical, as does the responsiveness of commanders on the ground, depending on whether more weapons from NATO countries can shine again.
Once the two sides invest considerable forces and start a fierce battle of encirclement and anti-encirclement, casualties may increase rapidly, and timely replenishment of troops and logistical supplies will be a challenge to both sides.
The focus of the next eastern battlefield is: whether the Russian army has the opportunity to justify its name, exert its long-range attack capabilities, armored assault capabilities, and take advantage of air superiority; whether the Ukrainian army can effectively organize, mobilize, coordinate, and make full use of the advantages of familiar terrain , continue to offset the Russian army’s advantage in close combat or night combat, and cause as much damage to the Russian army as possible.
Uncertainty over fighting in southern Ukraine
The Russian army only emphasized the adjustment of combat objectives to eastern Ukraine, but did not mention southern Ukraine. The Russian army continued to attack Malibo connecting the east and the south, and the two sides were still fighting fiercely.
After the Ukrainian capital Kyiv and the second largest city Kharkiv were out of the threat, the Ukrainian army entered a strategic counter-offensive. While doing its best to prevent the Russian army from encircling eastern Ukraine, it should also deploy troops to counter-attack the southern region. The Ukrainian military has claimed to start a counterattack against Kherson, and should also try to counterattack from around Malibo.
The counteroffensive of the Ukrainian army in the south and southeast should play a role in containing the Russian army. If the Russian army does not send heavy troops to support, it may be difficult to maintain the area already occupied; if the Russian army sends heavy troops to support, trying to keep the bargaining chip, it is bound to divide its troops from the battlefield of eastern Ukraine; if more troops are recruited from Russia to participate in the war, the Russian army will be expanded. war.
If the Ukrainian army dares to boldly counter-attack from around Malibo, cut off the connection between the eastern and southern Russian forces, or counter-attack from Kherson on a large scale to recover lost ground, it is equivalent to opening up a second battlefield, making the Russian army pay attention to one thing and another.
How big the fighting in southern Ukraine might be should depend on the total force Ukraine can mobilize and how much aid NATO can provide. If Ukraine can obtain anti-ship missiles and effectively control the Black Sea, it will put the Russian army occupying the south into a last stand.
The Ukrainian war situation has entered a new stage. The Russian-Ukrainian army will launch a new contest. The help of the United States and NATO will also have a key impact on the final victory.
Short video: Ukrainian military uses Javelin anti-tank missiles to attack Russian tanks. (Ministry of Defense of Ukraine)
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Responsible editor: Gao Yi#