The March 10 agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran not only restores diplomatic relations between the rival Gulf capitals, but indicates that Riyadh and Tehran do not intend to go to direct confrontation. Excellent news not only for the Middle East, but for all global players, dependent on energy as well as on the maritime-commercial routes of the Gulf. Starting with Chinese which mediated the final phase of an agreement which is the result, however, of two years of Arab diplomacy – therefore within the region – held between Iraq and Oman.
Here the certainties end. In fact, the rest is yet to be written: this arrangement is like a frame without a canvas. No one expects the Saudi and Iranian governments to really stop being rivals in the region: the promise on which the agreement is based is an end to mutual interference. Instead, the issues that bitterly pit Saudi Arabia and Iran are still all on the table: the question of Iranian nuclearthat of missiles as well as the role of pro-Tehran armed groups in the area. In short, the agreement is an important starting point, not an arrival point.
The signs of the thaw between Riyadh and Tehran
Between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the tide has slowly begun to change after the attacks of Iranian origin of 2019 against the Saudi Aramco installations. Faced with the non-reaction from the United States (Donald Trump was in the White House), Riyadh understood that it was necessary to move along a double track. And so he did. On the one hand, the kingdom has continued to strengthen its military capabilities, independently or through integrated defense with the United States. On the other hand, Riyadh has relaunched diplomatic dialogue with its neighbourhood, including Iran. With the aim of equipping itself with all possible instruments, military and political, to face a possible crisis scenario.
Since 2021, the Saudis and the Iranians, who severed diplomatic ties in 2016, have held talks, first in Iraq and then in Oman. Up to the handshake in China.
Some signs suggested that something was up. The United Arab Emirates, always the first to ‘sniff out the climate’, had sent the ambassador back to Tehran in the autumn; no statement from Saudi Arabia regarding bloody suppressed Iranian uprisings; talks between the Saudis and the Houthis of Yemen (militia-movement supported by Iran); especially the humanitarian aid from Riyadh to Syria after the earthquake, in the areas returned under the control of the regime of Bashar Al-Assad, Tehran’s first ally.
For the Saudis, the agreement with Iran – like the truce in Yemen – means protecting themselves from attacks against their territory and from escalations that would damage the economic projects of Vision 2030. The Iranian authorities are instead trying to re-legitimize themselves on the international scene, weakening the plan of an anti-Iran coalition cultivated by Israel and, so far, partially supported by the Saudis.
Nuclear Gulf?
There are two questions that Beijing’s agreement leaves unanswered. First the Iranian nuclear. Currently, Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program does not fall under the strategy of deterrence. But in the medium to long term? Unlike Abu Dhabi (which produces nuclear energy from 2020), Riyadh has not signed up to the gold standard for non-proliferation. Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman Al Saud intends to use the kingdom’s vast uranium resources. Above all, he warned that if Iran gets the bomb, the Saudis will too. The nuclearization of the Gulf is therefore not a remote hypothesis. Unless, precisely the Saudis, want to try to ‘defuse` the nuclear issue of Iran, perhaps in the broader framework of the possible normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Right now it’s just a scenario. And he’s not the only one.
Indeed, the timing of the Riyadh-Tehran deal may also reflect the Saudis’ awareness that Israel will never accept an Iran with an atomic bomb (either the United States, also considering the military cooperation between Iran and Russia), when the nuclear threshold will be reached: and according to the IAEA, it is very close. This is why Riyadh would have shaken hands with Tehran now: if the worst scenario for the region, i.e. an attack on Iran, were to occur, Saudi Arabia could thus limit the direct damage, having disengaged in advance.
Yemen after the deal
The other unanswered question of the agreement concerns pro-Iranian militias in the region (Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen). And their reactions, beyond the statements. Militias all linked to Tehran but in different ways: there are the proxies, and then the armed actors with a more autonomous political profile such as the Houthis of Yemen. Speaking of Yemen, which is eight years of war, the thaw between Saudi Arabia and Iran is an external incentive to renew the national truce, perhaps transforming it into a formal ceasefire. The truce was signed in April 2022, two months after the Houthis twice attacked the UAE.
However, there is one detail that is often overlooked: Yemen is not a proxy war. So the agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran must not fuel excessive expectations here. Saudis and Iranians (but also Saudis and Emiratis) are playing a battle for influence in Yemen: but the origins of the conflict are internal, for political power, control of resources and local autonomies. Saudi Arabia could now use the agreement with Iran to find a specific understanding with the Houthis, focused on the security of the Saudi-Yemeni border. Perhaps the exit strategy from Yemen that Riyadh has been looking for for some time to downgrade the conflict, in its agenda, to a ‘small local war’. For months, Saudi-Houthi talks have excluded the recognized Yemeni government, as well as the presidential council wanted by Riyadh. Among the secessionists of the Southern Transitional Council, who are formally part of the government, discontent is mounting for this too.
The Beijing agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran therefore opens a season of opportunities for the Middle East and beyond. However, it is probable that Riyadh and Tehran still have to discover some cards: the real future balances of the area will depend on these.
Cover photo EPA/NOURNEWS AGENCY