of Refugees International
After months of significant increase in irregular migration from Tunisia to Europe, the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen and the Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, together with other EU leaders, have chosen to promote what they believe is the best way to produce immediate results: increasing the supply of money, equipment and training for Tunisian security forces (FST) to combat the growing industry of irregular immigration.
At the end of 2023, the European Commission announced that it wanted to create agreements on “new operational anti-trafficking partnerships” which would increase border controls, cooperation between the police force and the judicial department and that with EU agencies (for example, Frontex). An “international conference on a global alliance to combat migrant trafficking” was also convened in Brussels on 28 November. As a senior EU official in Tunis told Refugees International, “there is a strong desire on the part of some in Europe to provide the Tunisian government and security forces with as many resources as possible as soon as possible to stop boats, now and in the future”.
The strategy envisaged by the EU, however, seems destined to failure, failing to achieve the objective of controlling irregular immigration and lacking the broader criteria of adhering to legal commitments, human rights principles and an effective overall migration policy. This approach demonstrates four main shortcomings.
The abusive and authoritarian practices of the Saïed government
First of all, unlike Turkey (according to some EU leaders as a successful model for preventing irregular immigration), Tunisia is a weaker state and divided which is becoming even more fragile because of the growing authoritarianism of the president Kaïs Saied. Despite the urgent need for financial aid to avoid bankruptcy, Saïed continues to undermine efforts to obtain support from the International Monetary Fund.
At the same time, Saïed has repeatedly threatened stability and state capacity since he unilaterally suspended Parliament in July 2021, dismantled local institutions, and used security forces to repress political opposition and imprison prominent dissidents. Saïed has systematically reduced the independence of the judiciary and attacked freedom of association and freedom of the press.
Less appreciated – but crucial for the EU’s objectives – is simultaneous weakening of the security sector of the country: already seriously divided before Saïed’s presidency, it now appears torn by growing fragmentation and internal conflicts. A leading Tunisian political analyst noted to Refugees International that the Interior Ministry, which controls the police, National Guard and Coast Guard, is experiencing further centrifugal collapse.
As for the migration policySaïed’s government and Tunisian security forces have responded not so much with professional migration management, but with inconsistent policies and abusive practices such as illegal expulsions in desert and border areas of thousands of people during the summer of 2023. This has resulted in dozens of deaths and injuries, as well as hundreds of migrants left stranded without help. In another reflection of the illegal approach taken, Tunisian authorities carried out new border expulsions in September 2023 transporting migrants by bus to locations known for human trafficking. In doing so, officials facilitated the industry and demonstrated publicly that they would periodically facilitate boardings if and when they deemed it necessary.
In this context of increasing state fragility, poor governance and illegal measures, the current Tunisian government is unlikely to be able to effectively allocate new resources to the security sector, implementing oversight and accountability reforms necessary to reduce departures and improve human and order of migration. The most likely outcome is renewed abuse of migrants with little impact on departures to Europe.
Profits linked to human trafficking
This reality is further reinforced by the presence of more and more FST elements who profit from trafficking operations. Survey conducted between August and October 2023 by Refugees International indicates that refugees have long been involved in the country’s human trafficking industry. Through dozens of interviews, including one with ten security officials in southern Tunisia, it is clear that the substantial profits available from the trafficking industry and weak state control have led to increased collusion by the FSTs as more and more migrants, refugees and asylum seekers pass through and leave Tunisia – while the economy in the southern areas contracts.
While possible links between such collusion and the leadership of higher-level FSTs remain unclear, there is minimal evidence of convictions for such practices. In recent months, security operations against traffickers and migrants have led to the arrest of a security official, who was publicly denounced. This lack of investigation raises significant questions about how additional resources and training for FSTs may impact migration flows, especially given that it will remain a strong profit motive. Increased EU support for immigration crackdowns, combined with occasional security interventions from Tunis, will produce only temporary “results”. However, this could increase pressure for new waves of abuse, as the government seeks to demonstrate that it has the boarding situation under control.
The Tunisian route is less dangerous
The third factor that undermines Europe’s efforts to discourage irregular immigration through Tunisia is that, despite the abusiveness of the FSTs, the conditions will most likely remain relatively less terrible compared to neighboring Libya or Algeria, where impunity, human rights violations and risks for migrants are much worse. As a Guinean migrant who arrived in Sfax after the expulsions at the beginning of July said: “At least in Tunisia I still smell freedom and rights… And this is enough to move forward.”
The starting conditions push people to emigrate
This aspect, as well as the geographical position of Tunisia straddling several European islands, is linked to a fourth factor that weakens the primary focus on irregular migration and human trafficking: the number of people fleeing from wars, poverty and instability in the region it will not decrease given that the conditions that drive them are destined to worsen. The result, therefore, is that there will continue to be a large number of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers in transit through Tunisia. As in so many other places in the world, the constant demand for human trafficking services for dangerous journeys to European shores will most likely be met by an increasingly entrenched industry; this will happen all the more as the Tunisian state falters and more and more officials become corrupt.
Rethinking migration policies in defense of human rights
The short-term approach towards Tunisia, put forward by “Team Europe”, is therefore destined to fail both on a personal level, failing to contain irregular immigration, and on a legal and ethical level, tying EU support to the inevitability of serious violations of human rights by the Tunisian authorities. As has been widely cited by human rights defenders, the EU Ombudsman and some European officials, the EU’s failure to include meaningful safeguards and controls for human rights abuses in Tunisia exposes it to a condition of complicity. This is in direct contradiction to EU law and values.
If informal migration to Tunisia cannot be significantly controlled by EU and Tunisian policies, and if irregular migration from Tunisia cannot be discouraged due to security force corruption and general state weakness, what options do they remain with EU politicians? In the immediate future, the EU must be willing to ask firm conditions on any agreement of migration management with Tunis, even at the risk of ruining any negotiations. This would include, at a minimum: ending the FST’s abuse of migrants, particularly the practice of summary detention and expulsion of migrants to border areas, investigating and convicting FST elements involved in human trafficking and human abuse migrants and facilitate a greater expansion of emergency relief services for migrants through the Tunisian Red Crescent and Tunisian and international humanitarian organizations.
The EU’s current urgent need to reach an agreement ends up granting a Saïed a huge negotiating leverage, to the detriment of guaranteeing an understanding that could be humane or effective. In consultations with Refugees International, senior EU officials in Tunis and Brussels expressed reluctance to adopt significant measures of oversight or accountability over EU-Tunisia migration cooperation, for fear that the Tunisian government would leave the table. If that were the case, the EU would have Already lost the prospect of a workable agreement. The default scenario based on Tunisia’s practices so far is that a new agreement would do little to address the corruption that is partially enabling the surge in irregular immigration, but could be strengthen the power of the security forces which have been responsible for systematic abuse. In such a scenario the EU would obtain little progress on migration, but it would seriously expose its reputation.
Taking a harder line with Tunisia would carry risks: Saïed could walk away from a deal which provides for significant accountability for abuse and measures to mitigate collusion with traffickers. But in both cases the levels of emigration may not appear that different. At least, by raising the debate on controls, the EU would have the chance to empower more responsible voices within the Tunisian system who have been appalled by the abuse, corruption and dismantling of the state witnessed in 2023.
In the long term, the EU should reconsider the feasibility of a deterrence-based migration policy in the Mediterranean. Almost a decade of deterrence and externalization policies it has shifted irregular immigration to different locations, fueled the growth of criminal networks that can make it more dangerous and monetize migrants’ desperation.
It is imperative that the EU explores and implements expansive and humanitarian-focused legal migration pathways. This change may represent the most effective solution for a long-term sustainable policy addressing irregular migration.