In some ways, the wait for the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the pipeline for some months is as spasmodic as it is speculative. Unlike the Russian invaders, the Ukrainian Armed Forces managed to impose the utmost secrecy on unit movements in the field and on the intentions of the General Staff, while continued the political and diplomatic action of Kyiv internationally – including President Zelensky’s visit to Rome. Ironically, beyond the daily reports, the only information available to evaluate the next developments on the front comes from leaks of the Pentagonwhich after weeks have now become largely obsolete, and by the noise coming from the Russian information bubble.
The preparatory moves of Kyiv and Moscow
L’ansia from i military bloggers Russians, but also in the statements of the defense spokesmen and in the words of the head of the mercenary company Wagner, Evgenii Prigozhin, reflects the actions taken by Moscow to prepare for the Ukrainian counter-offensive. In recent weeks, bombing campaigns against cities and along the front lines have intensified again. The purely terrorist use of imprecise droni iraniani Shahed 136/Geran 2 against city centers is joined by missile attacks against Ukrainian logistics hubs and infrastructure which would probably be used to launch the counter-offensive.
The Ukrainians are also conducting preparatory operationsThese include numerous incursions into Crimea against fuel and ammunition depots, sorties of small troops into the Dnieper delta in Kherson, but also sabotage of the railway network on the territory of the Russian Federation and air raids against Russian troop concentrations. In recent days it has also happened successfully a local counterattack in the Bakhmut areawhich made the Russian armed forces lined up on the flanks of the Wagner company engaged in the urban center back a couple of kilometers back.
The directive of the Ukrainian counter-offensive could come from any sector of a front hundreds of kilometers long. In the context of uncertainty, the Russian Defense Ministry is redeploying units and munitions across the entire front line and has decided to de-prioritize the war of position in Bakhmut. In doing so, the leaders of the armed forces entered in contrast to Prigozhinwho invested a lot of political capital and important military resources in taking the town, aiming for a symbolic victory that still eludes him thanks to the heroic Ukrainian resistance.
Tale fragmentation and politicization of the Russian chain of command and continued re-negotiation of positions and resources could slow down an effective response to the future Ukrainian initiative. Not surprisingly, from satellite data open source it would appear that the Russians have invested heavily in a number of defensive installations such as trenches, bunkers and casemates, especially in the Zaporizhia region and in the approaches to Crimea. This is a static approach that suggests low confidence in mobilized recruits and in the Russian ability to mount a flexible and mobile defense.
Forces and options available to Ukraine
The unknown if and how much remains il western support was enough to prepare the Ukrainian troops. Dai leaks of the Pentagon it is deduced that Kyiv will have at its disposal at least twelve brigades equipped with tanks, mechanized vehicles and artillery of western production. They will have to demonstrate that they can perform complex coordinated maneuvers under enemy fire and that they can maintain a certain degree of cohesion even in the event that the Russian units do not retreat in disorder. as had happened in the fall of 2022 in Lyman, and engage Ukrainian forces in sustained, large-scale, high-intensity combat from their defense positions.
This unknown factor and the aforementioned, understandable and legitimate, Ukrainian reserve on the counter-offensive impose caution in thinking about its chances and characteristics. In theory, Kiev has several options at its disposal, some of which are less viable than others. In geographical and operational terms, Crimea is an easily defensible bastion against Russiawhich makes a massive Ukrainian attack on the peninsula is very unlikely. The terminal part and the mouth of the Dniepr River, due to their breadth, represent a natural barrier that the Russian forces could exploit to more effectively defend the southern part of the Kherson region. The plains from Zaporizhia to Donbass instead make large maneuvers of heavy vehicles easier, especially from mid-May onwards with the change in ground conditions.
What military victory?
In this flat front hundreds of kilometers long, a possible deep breakthrough that would allow Ukrainian forces to reach the Azov Sea coastand thus interrupting the territorial continuity between the Russian-occupied territories in Crimea and Donbass, would represent a military victory for Ukraine, small but significant. Indeed, it would mark a major advance on the front after the stalemate of the past six months, weaken Russia’s ability to hold the Kherson and Zaporizhia areas, and challenge Russian control of the Sea of Azov itself. For the same reasons, such a retreat would represent a military defeat for Russiathe third since last summer after Lyman’s rout and Kherson retreat – not to mention the failure of the Russian blitzkrieg on Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odessa over a year ago.
How much and how a possible limited but significant Ukrainian military victory, and the specular Russian defeat, would affect the political choices of the respective leaderships on the continuation of the conflict, it is even more difficult to predict than the counter-offensive itself in the pipeline, as many more variables come into play. In military terms it will also count how the two armed forces will come to the end of the counter-offensive, for example in terms of respective human and material lossesof the Ukrainian logistical capacity to maintain the new front line, and of the endurance of Russian morale and hierarchical chain in the face of a possible defeat.
Cover photo EPA/Maria Senovilla