The Group of 20 meeting in New Delhi provided food for thought and an opportunity to gauge the current state of diplomatic positions of many emerging countries and some of the organizations that have become its reference in recent years, such as i BRICS (among which profound and significant changes are taking place) and theAfrican Union (accepted in all respects in the G20 assembly like the European Union).
Expectations and signals
The BRICS presented themselves in New Delhi, as a first test case since the announcement of the invitation to join the group officially extended to Argentina, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia and Iran and also therefore to the concrete demonstration of the will to be one political and economic leadership for countries in a certain way excluded from governance global guide to the southern hemisphere.
The absence of Xi Jinping at the G20 summit in India, which served international public opinion as a consequence of the resurgence of border tensions, had, according to some analysts and according to an interpretation that suits the subtlety of the methods of Chinese diplomacy, also ‘intention of reduce India’s growing power and his increased role as supporting actor at the helm of the BRICS and, in particular, the global south. Therefore, if the BRICS are destined to emerge definitively, they will soon be destined to have to resolve the relationship between India and China in a positive manner.
African Union and BRICS
As regards the relationship between BRICS and the African Union this has not always been smooth and, for example, the fact that Russia, India and China have adopted policies of exploitation of natural resources in certain African countries has led to tensions within the Union. Until now it seemed that a large part of these issues passed through the position that the South African Republic adopted: regional power in itself or emerging power within its own continent. With the opening of the BRICS group to Egypt and especially to Ethiopia (where some important AU institutions are based) the balances will necessarily be different.
At the BRICS meeting the Brazilian President Lula had already supported the entry of the African International Organization into the G20. This orientation had found the consensus of the other members: starting from 2024 Egypt and Ethiopia will be able to harmonize the orientation of the BRICS with that of the Union and, with the presence of the latter in the G20, increase the weight of the global south on the international stage.
Proof of the potential of this dynamic is in the weight given to Africa in the final document of the New Delhi summit but also in South Africa’s active role in supporting the needs of the global south. But the potential of this new balance can only be fully exploited if the Union, even before presenting itself on the international stage, manages to harmonize its internal divisions bridging the conflicts that have sometimes torn the organization apart (such as those over the Western Sahara issue) with diplomacy.
The declaration on war
The statement on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, in point eight of the final document, did not meet the expectations of Western countries and their allies making no direct mention of Russia and not using for example the terms “aggression” and “military”, and this certainly depended on the specific weight of India as an organizing country and of the BRICS in general. The orientation of the BRICS, with the presence of Russia, India and China, as is known and natural from a geopolitical point of view, is not a full condemnation of Moscow, and the bland declaration on the war (as defined in the document) in Ukraine appears to the majority of commentators as one victory for the group and Moscow in particular.
However, the fact that a declaration was issued with the efforts of the host country and that it recommends adapting to provisions of international law, in particular Resolutions ES-11/1 of 2 March 2022 and ES-11/6 of 23 February 2023 (from the vote of which, paradoxically, India had abstained) constitutes more of a victory for New Delhi’s diplomacy than for the BRICS in general.
The value of the summit for India
It is no coincidence that Narendra Modi decided to qualify his country for the G20 with the name of Bharat (which has a traditional and at the same time inclusive meaning of the entire Subcontinent), achieved good success. In India the summit has already been presented by many voices as a great event, and if the “Times of India” headlines: Global consesus made in India, the government gathers around the figure of the nationalist Prime Minister celebrating their organizational and leadership skills.
This is an internal celebration rather than a real result, since various issues remain unresolved for Indian international politics, such as the aforementioned relationship with China in the renewed BRICS group, which can only benefit the party of Prime Minister in the upcoming elections of the largest “democracy” in the world (which is also losing its democratic appeal).
In the international context for Modi However, the G20 summit leaves many more questions than answers. How will the relationship between powers with Beijing be defined? To what extent will the nationalist leader of a nationalist party be able to place himself at the head or supporting leader of an international front that brings together the majority of emerging countries to obtain a more equitable international order? Will the Indian economy, set on a flattering track, be able to sustain results worthy of New Delhi’s role as a power?
Cover photo EPA/INDIA PRESS INFORMATION BUREAU