On August 15, 2021, two years ago, i Taliban quickly conquered the whole of Afghanistanincluding Kabul, ending the Afghan state supported by the international community, and the longest war led by the United States and NATO.
After the fall of the Republic of Afghanistan, the economy collapsedopening up to a serious food and agricultural crisis, accentuated by the growing cost of cereals as a result of the Russian conflict in Ukraine.
Afghanistan between economic crisis and terrorism
The Taliban government, whose collaboration with the Pakistan it is increasingly narrow, it has immediately demonstrated a serious inefficiency in responding to the needs of the population; an incapacity aggravated by fundamentalist ideology based on the restriction of individual rights, especially those of donne which, despite international condemnations, continue to pay the highest price. Added to this is the growing activism of jihadist groups, including theIS-K (il franchise Afghan terrorist group Islamic state), engaged in an endless ideological struggle, which is opposed by a never-ending symbiotic relationship between the Taliban, now in power, and al-Qa’ida.
What we can observe is a picture that defines a situation persistent regional insecurity from increasingly worrying global effects, such as the expansion of jihadism in Asia and Africa, especially in the Sahel, they are confirming.
Looking at the dire economic situation in Afghanistan, a recent analysis of theAfghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) highlighted a drastic contraction in GDP, the presence of a fragile banking system and half of the population in a condition of severe poverty. A framework in which the Taliban in their actions and inactions worsen the situation, while the banking system collapses and social unease spreads.
Also opium production has declined – most likely a Taliban choice to raise the price on the market, as has already happened in the past – but this damages the fragile rural communities, which have the only source of livelihood in the opium economy; at the same time conflicts are emerging over water, both internal and external with Iran.
Internal competition within the Taliban government
The iconic date of September 11, 2021 marks the beginning of the activity of the Taliban government, led by the mullah Mohammad Hassan Akhundappointed by the Supreme Taliban Leader, the sweetie Hibatullah Akhundzadaon the precise indication of the Pakistani services and in contrast to the mullah Ghani Baradar, favored by the USA who had wanted him as an interlocutor in the negotiating agreements in Qatar concluded in 2020. From the outset, members of some Pashtun factions of the movement, mainly from the south and east of the country, have been part of the government; a choice that has aroused growing resentment from excluded groups, especially those in northern and western Afghanistan.
Hibatullah makes use of two key figures: Sirajuddin Haqqanihead of the Eastern Pashtun faction, linked to al-Qa’ida and today Minister of the Interior, and the mullah Mohammad YaqoubMinister of Defense and son of the founder of the Taliban, the mullah Omar. However, the balance between the factions proved to be precarious from the outset and characterized by power struggles and violent clashes between the parties.
The killing of the old leader of al-Qa’ida Ayman al-Zawahiriwhich took place at the hands of the United States in Kabul in July 2022, unveiled the squeeze connection between the Taliban and international terrorism. The presence of al-Zawahiri in Kabul, guest of Sirajuddin Haqqani, confirmed the latter’s role in facilitating fruitful collaboration between the Taliban and al-Qa’idaconsolidated by marriage ties between Arab Qaedists and the Haqqani family, which led the group to acquire a growing role and prestige in the context of global jihadism. A collaboration which, especially in the last two years, has done nothing but increase the opportunities and the will for armed confrontation between the IS-K, al-Qa’idaminor jihadist groups and the Afghan resistance in Panjshir led by Ahmad Massoud.
The United States, while trying to eradicate al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan since 2001, not only have they never managed to eliminate the threat but, with the victory of the Taliban, have witnessed its gradual strengtheningalbeit with increasing subordination of al-Qa’ida to the Afghan group. And precisely the victory of the Taliban was exploited by al-Qa’ida – as well as by IS-K – to accelerate the transfer of its acolytes to Afghanistan “liberated” by the Taliban, confirming its resilience and the links between Qaedists, Taliban and the Haqqani.
The disputed succession between Sirajuddin and Yaqoub
Sirajuddin and Yaqoub are the two trusted “right-hand men” of the Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhundzada, but the prolonged absence from the public scene of the supreme leader raises more and more doubts about his supposed deathas already happened with the founder of the movement, the mullah Omar, who died in 2013, was declared such only two years later.
Already in June 2020, Hibatullah had been temporarily forced to hand over power to the two young deputies, due to the serious consequences of Covid-19; and so Sirajuddin Haqqani and Yaqoub, though fighting each other for absolute power, have established themselves as leader for the time of the movementeach supported by the reference power groups.
In support of the hypothesis of handover to the young generation of Taliban leaders, in August 2022, aTaliban assembly in Kandahar would have started a discussion intended to lead to the dismissal of Hibatullah, precisely in favor of Yaqoub and Haqqani (option favorably supported by the United States and Pakistan), however opening up to a conflict with the mullah Baradar (formerly close to Washington but now on good terms with China and Russia).
The removal of Hibatullah and the appointment of Yaqoub as a possible successor to Hibatullah and Sirajuddin, possible head of the Taliban government, appear to be linked to the killing of al-Zawahiri in Kabul. A fact that may be the US attempt to avoid divisions among the Taliban to contain the influence of China and Russia through an improbable, but always opportune, “control” of the Taliban leaders.
EPA/STRINGER cover photo