When an ambitious transformation process, as is the building a defense Europe, slows down and, indeed, in some components it stops, we must try to understand what the causes are, how serious they are and what, if practicable, are the possible remedies. Faced with numerous worrying signs, hoping that this is a temporary disturbance destined to pass with the end of the electoral campaign for the next European elections which has already begun could prove to be a dangerous illusion.
The European response to Russian aggression
The trigger for the current crisis can be found in the Russian attack on Ukraine. L’Russian aggression it alarmed the countries of the European Union also because few had expected it until then: despite the annexation of Crimea which took place eight years earlier, few believed that the Russian Federation would go so far as to blatantly violate solemn commitments and international law within the Old Continent.
Hence a strong European response which was articulated on three levels, in harmony with the transatlantic one:
– political (condemnation of the aggression and strengthening of NATO both on an operational level and with its enlargement to Sweden and Finland);
– economic (increasingly heavy sanctions);
– military (transfer to Ukraine of vehicles and, above all, ammunition and missiles; greater effort and “seriousness” in respecting the commitment made in 2014 to reach a share of 2% of GDP for military spending; start of massive programs national acquisitions of military equipment).
All this happened in a context in which the only available political-military organization, the Natowas, according to some, on the road to decline, above all because the center of gravity of the strategic and military confrontation was moving towards the Indo-Pacific (and so the American military attention and commitment) and, vice versa, had just been the foundations have been laid to build the Europe of defense (at least at the level of political will and greater operational, technological and industrial collaboration, moreover in a very weak framework on an institutional and even legal level given that we continue to live with a Treaty that is still subject to modifications introduced in December 2009).
The inevitable choice was, therefore, to try to repair the old transatlantic construction (and pretend not to see its objective limits in dealing with the new geo-strategic scenario) and not to invest excessive energy in the new one that was slowly taking shape, the European one. Obviously those who hoped to be able to find shelter in the latter had to quickly move or lower their heads to try to survive the storm (which, however, lasts beyond all expectations and risks becoming endemic, in line with climate change).
Among the secondary effects of this political-military strengthening of NATO was the greater attention to eastern front and, within it, the number of states that consider the Russian threat as a priority, with the consequent oblivion of the southern front despite the dramatic increase ininstability of the central African belt in addition to the Libyan one. Furthermore, Russian influence is growing and consolidating in these African countries, which in itself should worry the West and above all the European Union both for the strategic consequences and for the immediate ones such as the further push towards emigration phenomenon.
The defense implications of the war in Ukraine
If we focus on the third level of the European response, the military one, these critical issues emerge, among others:
1 The transfer of equipment to Ukraine has been progressive the European armed forces were undefended: after the Russian-built vehicles still available, it was necessary to switch to Western ones (with the relative ammunition) and as the conflict dragged on and the Russian bombing of the entire Ukrainian territory intensified, increasingly more modern means had to be supplied. Since, apart from the United States, the other Western countries were only prepared for a short-term resistance in the face of possible Russian attacks (counting on NATO and in particular American intervention), their equipment and supplies were reduced below of the guard level. Hence a strong push to quickly acquire new equipment.
2 The increase in military spending towards 2% of GDP is already resulting new immediate orders, although some countries such as Italy and now Germany have recognized that the 2024 deadline will be delayed by four to five years and the new slowdown in the European economy could also create problems for other partners. Since the European technological and industrial base has for decades been sized on a limited continental market, much of the new demand is seeking an answer from non-European companies (especially American) or through the start/extension/revitalization of national programs to equip themselves with modern equipment which represent only the most recent evolution of the current ones and not a generational leap. This risks causing two negative consequences: it will increase the range of systems in service in European countries, despite the desired homogenization which would favor operational and logistical effectiveness (thus managing to make better use of the limited financial resources of European countries) and it will damage in perspective the new joint research and development programs because it will slow down or limit the subsequent passage to their industrialization and production (the countries that have just finished acquiring new equipment will certainly not be anxious to proceed with its rapid replacement).
3 L’launch of national programs for the acquisition of military equipment it was and is inevitable for reasons of urgency (when they are available), of operational effectiveness (being already in service and known), of logistical efficiency (many spare parts are common, even if sometimes the versions are different), of economic support (being strategic capabilities to be protected) and social (in an economically difficult moment). But this choice should be made with great foresight, guaranteeing the maximum possible balance between the choices that must move in the short term and those that are projected into the long term (taking into account that both inevitably overlap in the medium term). This means ensuring that decisions are not mutually exclusive, but can coexist by finding temporal and financial compromises between the needs of today and those of tomorrow, between national and European/international solutions.
The importance of European cooperation
The main European countries, however, should not lose sight of the reasons that have pushed them up to now to seek in European collaboration programs the only real solution to the need to have a effective and sustainable defense, at least for the most important programs (large naval units and submarines, combat and transport aircraft, combat and heavy helicopters, tanks and armored combat vehicles, missiles, satellites). They should, therefore, continue on this path by strengthening, on the basis of past experiences, the principle of interdependence between participants: only in this way can the sharing of technological and industrial sovereignty be combined with the specialization of national capabilities. At the same time, they should ensure the participation of willing and able countries to discourage them from seeking competing solutions that would end up hurting everyone.
But it should also mean that the European institutions do not compromise the start of a common path towards new generations of equipment through financing of research and development programs (with the European Defense Fund and other collateral measures) to meet the needs of the moment (compared to which, however, they may still have limited effectiveness).
However, this different approach is not sufficient because the current difficulties have highlighted the intrinsic difficulties of the European integration process in the field of defence, linked above all to the diversity and lack of homogeneity of the Member States.
Twenty-five years ago the six main European countries decided to start a integration process between them which resulted two years later in a International treaty (the Farnborough Framework Agreement) and, within three years, in six implementing agreements. The initiative was then superseded by the launch of broader ones decided within the framework of the European Union (first the EDA and then the intervention of the Commission and the Council).
Today, a reflection should be reopened on the possibility of a new initiative by the major countries which, starting from the highest political and military level, recovers the original spirit of PESCO, permanent structured cooperation. On this level, Italy, also thanks to the newfound political stability and credibility of the Minister of Defense and the Armed Forces, could play a primary role.
Cover photo EPA/FEHIM DEMIR