The determining element of Maduro’s economic strategy is that there is no strategy. He gropes, floundering financially, hoping that providence will come to the rescue. Above he is trapped, as we will explain below. Let’s not forget that the socialism that Chávez bequeathed to Maduro is based on distribution, not on productive activity as Carlos Marx exposed. Nothing about “liberating the productive forces”; rather, its parasitization. If the holders of this curious “socialism” were defined according to how they relate to the productive process –the methodology with which Marx elaborated his theory–, they would be landowners. They live (and how!) from land rent, in this case, from what is captured by the sale of crude oil in international markets, as well as from exactions that, by taking possession of the territory by force and exclusivity ( Venezuela), they impose on their inhabitants. Invoking a change for the future –socialism, in the Marxian imaginary– these “revolutionaries” have been consolidating an arrangement more akin to feudalism. To complete, sovereignty, which “resides non-transferably in the people”, was usurped by the eternal with the story that “Chávez is the people”. Like when the monarchy. But these outdated emulators of past lordships fall for a lie calling themselves “revolutionaries”, denouncing imperialism and the oligarchy, to cover up their depredation. And, from the antipodes of the socialism proclaimed by Marx, they assume its discursive categories and the clichés of communist mythology, to appear on the “correct” side of History.
Chávez took the country’s rentier culture to the extreme. He reaped the conviction, assumed by many, that the perception of oil revenues made us rich, so our problems were due to mistakes, ineptitude or corruption of whoever was in power. But, unlike AD and Copei, who sought to build an institution in which income contributed to finance a battery of incentives for productive activity in order to “sow oil”, he and his handpicked dedicate themselves to destroying it -including PDVSA itself, which “now belonged to everyone” – alleging that the “oligarchy” was fleecing the people. Profits (and losses) from commercial activities protected by the legal framework of representative democracy, although subject to certain State interventions, were surpassed by the unrestricted possibilities of profit professing unconditional loyalty to the leader and to the “revolution”, and playing the keys suitable. These new “rules of the game”, whose rewards and punishments are based on political criteria that shape the behavior of Venezuelans, were shaping a “de facto” institutionality that ended up undermining the “de jure” institutionality made explicit in the 1999 Constitution.
Chávez’s progressive dismantling of the rule of law was the expression of a new correlation of political forces, woven with populist preaching aimed at harvesting frustrated expectations and unfulfilled hopes in 40 years of democracy. What he promised now was to join a movement that professed its loyalty to Chávez. Their bosses could, at their discretion, open doors and guarantee impunity for illegal hiring, overpricing, commissions, extortion, misappropriation and other practices formally prohibited by the legal system. Networks of complicity were sown throughout the decision-making apparatus, which forged into true mafias, dedicated to plundering social wealth in the name of the “revolution.”
In opposition to the duties and the enjoyment of rights related to the observance of the law and the social valuation of faculties or competences through the market, in the field of work and/or by the community, an alternative idea of ”should be ” social based on the imaginary that the “Bolivarian revolution” was building of itself. The criterion of truth and of what is considered correct and just came to depend on its functionality towards the interests of power. “Within the Revolution, everything; outside of the Revolution, nothing” as stated by Chávez’s new godfather, Fidel Castro. Thus, political power was transformed into an alliance between mafias, coupled with the profit opportunities provided by the collapse of the scaffolding of counter-powers, norms and obligations of the constitutional order. Without these restrictions, the State becomes an instrument to execute the preferences of those who control power. This makes its conservation imperative, however, under penalty of losing such perks and facing the corresponding legal penalties.
Unlike classic dictatorships, the mafias that have taken over Venezuela have a morality that supports and legitimizes their excesses, built on the basis of a false reality that is nourished by the “truths” of communist mythology and jingoistic misrepresentation. with which Chávez built his rise to power. There is no moral, ethical or legal safeguard that restricts their desires. His fictional world is refractory to external criticism, since the criteria of truth and liberal justice are foreign to him. In this way, they feel morally shielded and do not have to consider arguments that question their behavior. As we have painfully verified, this lack of restraints has materialized in the widespread violation of human rights in the country, with a balance of hundreds shot at in street demonstrations, political prisoners, many of them tortured, and millions of migrants fleeing. of the hardships that have resulted from the plunder regime that was installed.
And here is the trap to which we were referring. The depredation of the mafia alliances on which the power led by Maduro is sustained has aggravated the living conditions of Venezuelans to such an extent that social conflict threatens to spill over, endangering the sustainability of the regime. Likewise, the economy, reduced to almost a quarter of a decade ago, is not enough loot to satisfy the desires of those who live for power. Although the liberalization of prices and foreign exchange transactions has halted its decline, vested interests and the inherent dynamics of the de facto institutions –“rules of the game”– that have been imposed prevent additional reforms necessary for them to fully bear fruit. . This would imply restoring rights and guarantees, putting an end to corruption and eliminating predatory practices, in order to generate the confidence that would be the basis for the reactivation of the economy.
In an attempt to contain the social protest, Maduro announces salary increases, now bonuses without incidence on benefits, for which he does not have the income to pay them. The economic ruin and the destruction of PDVSA have left it with a minimal tax base and the non-payment of the enormous debt, happily contracted until recently, together with the sanctions that have been imposed on its government, prevent it from accessing external financing. . He resorts, then, to the monetary issue – the “inorganic” money – to finance those increases / bonuses, which, as the Venezuelan has well learned, is gasoline for inflation. Trying to contain it by further reducing public spending, drying up bank credit and spending scarce foreign currency to stabilize its price, what it does is aggravate the situation of the economy: further deterioration of public services, miserable salaries and a hostile environment for companies due to the absence of financing, insecurity and the overvaluation of the bolivar.
Maduro aspires to have more income to overcome this quagmire by getting the sanctions on the sale of Venezuelan oil lifted and restricting his access to fresh money abroad. To do this, he has to agree to the call for reliable elections, a requirement demanded by the governments of the United States and the EU. But he knows that he cannot comply, because, unless the opposition commits a harakiri by coming divided, it would lose inexorably. The plunder regime, with its de facto institutions that protect the depredation, would be dismantled in order to restore the constitutional order and the rule of law. Inadmissible for the mafia alliances that support Maduro. As his options narrow, he attacks the most vulnerable links in the chain of complicity –those associated with Tareck el Aissami–, with the hope of regaining room for manoeuvre. How many more links will he have to remove, without destabilizing his command? Because the reforms to restore the guarantees and to be able to count on the investments and international financing required, do not seem to be on their agenda.
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