03 June 2022 10:02
This week, celebrated New York Times reporter Thomas Friedman made a startling self-criticism. Friedman admitted that he assumed that Europe, after the initial emotional surge in the face of the invasion of Ukraine, would quickly regain its habits with respect to Russia, but after a visit to Europe he wanted to write “I was wrong” to three times, to avoid any doubts.
Friedman’s surprise is the same one that caught the Europeans. If it is right not to rely too much on clear-cut judgments such as “nothing will be the same again”, it must be recognized that the war in Ukraine has had a deeper impact than was initially imagined.
The latest sign of this shock wave is the result of the referendum organized in Denmark, in which two thirds of Danes have affirmed their desire for their country to join the European defense system. In 1992 Denmark activated an exclusion clause on defense matters when the Maastricht Treaty was adopted. Thirty years later, the war in Ukraine prompted the Danes to change course.
Historical turning points
The decision must be compared to those of Finland and Sweden, which have chosen to renounce their neutrality and ask for NATO membership. Even in that case it was a historical turning point.
The positive aspect is that there is an undeniable awareness, throughout Europe, of the need to exist as a power (a taboo word in some countries) in order to defend the collective interests of Europeans. We are a long way from the simple free trade zone that the British dreamed of.
This leap forward comes with considerable challenges
As we well know, Europe only advances through crises. Covid-19 highlighted numerous weaknesses of the Union, but the 27 managed to overcome the crisis by creating the relaunch fund and accepting a share of shared debt for the first time. The same thing is happening with the war in Ukraine: the conflict has shifted the European Union’s gears on issues related to defense and sovereignty. But this leap forward comes with considerable challenges.
The main one is that of cohesion. The longer this war continues, the more it will put a strain on the unity of the 27, or rather the 26, because we must already put aside the case of Viktor Orbán’s Hungary, an opposition front in itself.
Even among other countries, at the Versailles summit last March, tensions emerged between the eastern flank, closest to the Russian threat, and the western one. These contradictions risk making themselves felt in the countdown that separates us from the next European Council, at the end of June, when it will be necessary to study Ukraine’s candidacy and the French proposal to create a European political community.
These two arguments that crystallize the new balance of forces within the European Union will reveal its ability to define a common medium and long-term strategy for the whole continent, including the Balkans and Ukraine. All the elements are in place for Europe to emerge strengthened from this collective test which will probably last over time. Provided we don’t let the virus of division prevail, as Vladimir Putin hopes.
(Translation by Andrea Sparacino)