The restoration of diplomatic relations between Iran e Saudi Arabiaafter more than two years of talks conducted in Iraq e Oman and with the “final” mediation initiative of the Chinese Of Xi Jinping, is a potentially significant event for regional balances. Interviewed by Cnbc in the days following the agreement, the Saudi finance minister, Mohammad Al-Jadaaneven announced the possibility of Riyadh returning “very soon” to invest in Iranwhile second Amwaj.media in the coming days the Iranian delegates will also meet their UAE counterparts. The agreement constitutes a success of Beijing who burst onto the scene as a leading player in the dynamics of dialogue and peacemaking in the Middle East, by virtue of a more balanced, less compromised positioning than that assumed in recent decades by the United Stateswhich today continue in their disengagement from the region. Changes that, hopefully, can lead to important changes in relation to one of the bloodiest and most forgotten conflicts of the 21st century: the guerra in Yemenin which Saudi Arabia and Iran face each other, even if not directly, on the battlefield.
Relations between Riyadh and Tehran have been troubled since 1979, but they had reached their lowest point in early 2016, with the withdrawal of ambassadors and the rupture of diplomatic relations in the aftermath of the attacks by some demonstrators – angry at the execution of the death penalty against the Shiite religious Nimr Baqir al Nimrin the eastern Saudi province of Al Sharqiyya – to the Saudi embassy in Tehran and the consulate of Mashhad. The rupture was then followed by the “solidarity” choice of the Emiratis who had reduced relations with Tehran to the mere presence of a charge d’affaires to Abu Dhabi.
Since then, and increasingly since the election of Trump in January 2017, almost simultaneously with the rise of Mohammad Bin Salmanthe prevailing sensation – corroborated by the succession of a series of accidentsOf intelligence operations military and various low-intensity skirmishes – had been that of a continuous risk of escalation between the Islamic Republic and the “informal” block consisting of IsraelSaudi Arabia ed United Arab Emirates. The Abraham Accordssigned in August 2020 – seven months after the assassination of the general Qassem Soleimani – Between BahrainUnited Arab Emirates and Israel, with Trump’s United States as mediators, seemed to herald a further push towards regional polarization.
If for Iran the search for a rapprochement with Riyadh was functional to the breaking of one’s isolation international – given the influence the Saudis also have over countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt e Jordanfor Saudi Arabia, as he explained Mohammad Salami of the International Institute for Global Strategic Studies, the main motivation lay in the need to unlock his own diplomatic “paralysis”. in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria e Yemenfueled by strong Iranian influence.
It is precisely on the conflict in Yemen that the most important developments are expected and it is probably in relation to some guarantees provided on this dossier that the two regional giants have sat down at the Chinese table. “The Saudis have always placed Iran’s commitment to peace as a precondition to signing this agreement de-escalation in Yemen. And according to what Riyadh told me, it was Tehran that actually accepted two elements: stop sending weapons – missiles e droneseven if Tehran has always denied – the Houthi and put pressure on the latter to sign an agreement with the Saudis that has been on the table for weeks,” explains a Ilfattoquotidiano.it Cynthia Whiteexpert on Gulf Countries for the European Council on Foreign Relations and author with Matthew Legrenzi of the volume The Arab Monarchies of the Gulf: New Center of Gravity in the Middle East.
It should be remembered, in fact, that in addition to those between Iran and Saudi Arabia, independent talks had also been underway for some time between the latter and the Houthi rebels themselves, who control part of Yemen, including the capital Occupation. “For this reason – continues Bianco – the special envoy of the United Nations in recent days he went to Iran, while the American one did the same to Oman and Saudi Arabia, so as to materialize this agreement. We are therefore expected positive developments on this dossier, pessimistically within a month, also because otherwise it cannot be ruled out that Riyadh will tear up the agreement with Teheran”. According to Mohammad Salami, however, the game is a bit more complicated: “The conflict in Yemen is partly linked to structural problems of the two countries which are based on irreconcilable starting ideologies – explains a Ilfattoquotidiano.it – Iran perceives itself as the defender of the Shiites in the world and this translates into the fact that it considers it an ideological and revolutionary duty to support these communities, even to the detriment of the nation’s interests, even if this implies an increase in sanctions and of widespread poverty. That said, I believe that Tehran will not abandon the Houthis. It is possible that he will be willing to find a solution for peace in Yemen, but the intention remains to use the Houthis as a negotiating card with Riyadh in the future”.
Read what was reported to the agency Irna by the Iranian delegation to the United Nations, filters a discreet optimism also from Tehran: “The agreement with Riyadh can accelerate efforts for the renewal of a cease-fire (collapsed last October, after the Houthis asked the Saudis to pay wages not only of their government officials, but also of militiamen in the areas under their control, thus effectively asking them to finance the army they fight, ndr) and stimulate a national dialogueso as to form an inclusive national government in Yemen”.
An agreement in Yemen, however, could also be complicated by some factors deriving from the specific interests of the actors on the ground, on the one hand the Yemeni government “in exile” Aden and the Southern Transitional Council – which according to some observers they would have felt “marginalized” in these talks – and on the other hand the Houthis themselves, who enjoy Iran’s support but have their own agenda. “Iran has the ability to encourage the Houthis towards an escalation, but it is not known what power they have in the opposite direction, i.e. towards a de-escalation”, he told Axios Veena Ali-KhanYemeni researcher fromInternational Crisis Group.
This is echoed by Salami himself, who added that “even if Iran can influence the Houthis, it certainly does not have the power to command them. Their movement is independent from Tehran, especially regarding the possibility of continuing hostilities or ending them with negotiations. Tehran and Riyadh will sooner or later come to the conclusion that the Houthis and the government of Aden (which pushes for a division of the country into north and south, as it was before 1990, ndr) are two inseparable entities and that the road to Yemen must pass through both groups”. It will therefore be necessary – he said Abu Bakr Al Shamahi are Al Jazeera – that all groups involved in the conflict in Yemen be included in the next round of negotiations, rather than being called upon to sign agreements concluded by others, also because it should not be taken for granted that a possible Saudi withdrawal from Yemen will determine the end of hostilities.
A feeling actually strengthened by the statements to the issuer Al Mayadeen Of Abdulwahab al-Mahbashi, member of the political wing of the Houthis. “Saudi Arabia must know that our relationship with Iran is not one of subordination, but a relationship based on Islamic brotherhood. The resolution of the conflict in Yemen – continued Al Mahbashi – can only pass through negotiations between Sana’a and Riyadh, not between Riyadh and Tehran. Even if Saudi Arabia signed an agreement with Iran joint defenseor even of military alliance, this would not protect them from our reactions if it were to continue the aggression against us”.