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This article is the fifth of the author’s Afghanistan series of review articles
Afghanistan: The place where the conquerors “success”?
The recent events in Afghanistan have once again aroused heated discussion about the “imperial cemetery”.
However, in the past, some people have made a powerful correction in fact and logic to the popular “imperial cemetery” from a historical perspective: as the Afghan writer Ansari pointed out: “Great powers that intervene in the situation in Afghanistan always seem to be defeated. The terrain here is complex and the people are good at war. This is indeed a special challenge for the conquerors. This idea seems to be wise and transcendent, but it is quite wrong. Historically, Afghanistan has fallen under the iron hoof of foreign enemies. “
Ansari cited the Aryans, who brought the name “Ariana” (Afghan National Airlines has always been called “Ariana Airlines”) and Indo-European languages. Later, the Persian Empire conquered this place, and the Iranian branch of the Indo-European language family continues to this day (Pashto, Dari, and Tajik are all belonging to this branch). The conquest of Alexander of Macedonia brought about the “Hellenic” dynasties that lasted for more than 200 years. The Peacock Empire of the Indians in South Asia and the Kushuang Empire of the Dayue people successively conquered this place, making Afghanistan appear Buddhist for hundreds of years, and merged with the previous Hellenistic civilization to produce Gandhara art. It was in Afghanistan that the early Buddhism of the statues learned this art of statues originating from Greece. Without these conquests, India would not have Ajanta, China would not have Dunhuang, and Afghanistan would not have the Bamiyan Buddha. The disaster of the Taliban has reduced it from human heritage to human regret.
And if the Arabs did not conquer and rule Afghanistan for a long time, where did the Islam that almost all the people believe in today, including the “Emir” of the Taliban, come from?
In modern times, in Ansari’s words, “The Turks will annex this place even more often. The Mongolian army that swept past turned Afghanistan into a ghost territory.” (Note 1) Afghanistan is “the imperial cemetery” “? At least it is not the cemetery of the Mongol Empire. In the 15th century, the Turkic Mongols, Timur and his descendant Babur not only conquered Afghanistan, but also further conquered India based in Afghanistan, where they established the Mughal Empire that lasted for more than 300 years.
Generally speaking, if Afghanistan is regarded as the land of the Pashtuns (that is, the Afghans in ancient times, seen in historical records since the 3-4th century AD), then most of the two thousand years here have been the Afghans surrendered to the land. The history of external conquerors here is not so much an “imperial cemetery” as it is an “imperial paradise”.
The “imperial cemetery” of the local people?
The country established by Pashtun or “Afghanis” should be counted from the Lodi dynasty in 1451-1526. But it was not built in Afghanistan today, but in India today. At the beginning of the 13th century, the Turks who conquered India from Afghanistan to the south and established the Delhi Sultanate for more than 3 centuries. It included five short-lived dynasties, the last of which was the Pashtun general who followed the Turks to the south. Built by Barulodi. When the author visited India, I lived near the Lodi Tombs and the “Lodi Gardens” in the center of Delhi today. I wandered among the monuments here and marveled at the typical Indian style of these Afghan royal tombs and temples.
In addition, there are several short-term royal powers established by the sturdy Pashtun generals, who have usurped the power to seize power, such as the “Suri Dynasty” that was usurped for 16 years during the Mughal period in India, and the division of Bangladesh for 12 years. The “Kalani dynasty” and the Azad Khan regime that ruled northwestern Iran in 1752-1757. These regimes are far away from present-day Afghanistan, even far from the “Pashtostan” region, and they are all short-lived. It gives people the feeling that the Pashtuns at that time seemed to only be good at general, and not good at the king. It is not so much that Afghanistan itself is an “imperial cemetery”, it is better to say that places outside Afghanistan are the “imperial cemetery” of these emperor Pashtun dreamers.
On the map of Afghanistan today, the kingdom established by the Pashtuns should actually start from the Hotak Kingdom (1709-1738) in the early 18th century, and thereafter the Durrani Dynasty (1747-1823) and the Balakzai Dynasty ( 1823–1926) and the Kingdom of Afghanistan (1926–1973). What is interesting is that these dynasties are relatively short-lived. Except for the Barakzai dynasty which barely lasted for a century, the rest of the kingdoms are only a few decades old, which is shorter than the dynasties established by most foreign conquerors. Moreover, the order during the period of the dynasty was also unstable, with frequent coups, separatism, and military conflicts. It reflects the long-term political turmoil in this region in modern times. In a sense, the rapid destruction of these local dynasties can also be said to be “imperial cemeteries”, but it has nothing to do with foreign conquerors.
On the contrary, the main ethnic minorities in Afghanistan today seem to be more capable of building a country than the Pashtuns. In the history of the Tajik people, a powerful Saman Dynasty (819-999) was established. The country once included most of Inner Asia, and the country lasted for 180 years. The Gul Dynasty (879-1215) once occupied Central Asia and North India, and had a kingdom for three centuries. The Karti Dynasty (1244-1381) was established in parts of present-day Afghanistan, Iran and Turkmenistan for 137 years. Not to mention the Uzbeks, who are the main “political nation” in Central Asia. But today the political entities of these two ethnic groups are outside Afghanistan. Does the so-called “imperial cemetery” also include them?
Obviously, although Afghanistan does have complex terrain and violent folk customs, this does not prevent foreign conquerors from gaining power. On the contrary, the rugged terrain, complex ethnic groups, extreme sectarian politics and unruly tribal society make it easier for local warlords to segregate. As a result, there are many lords, heroes and heroes, and the integration of nation-states is difficult, forming an “imperial cemetery” in the local sense.
In other words, these “features” of Afghanistan are not so much conducive to “busting foreigners” as they are difficult to “Anni”. In this case, the local warlords are often more brutal than dealing with external invaders, and even more brutal than external invaders to suppress the locals (like Hikmatyar is more brutal than the Soviets, and the Taliban are more brutal than the US. The same brutal). The main problem faced by external invaders is not how the locals unite and resist the insults and persist in resistance, and how strong the local army is to fight. It is not easy to “knead” the country after the (often easy) successful conquest. ——But as long as it is barbaric enough, it is no more difficult than local forces to reinforce themselves and sweep the heroes. This is why the rule established by the ancient external conquerors in Afghanistan is often more stable than the rule of the locals, especially the Pashtuns.
The paradox of civilization and barbarism
Therefore, after the completion of the conquest of the external forces, in fact, it is inevitable that one of the two choices later: Either leave the locals aside, the conqueror directly “the weak and the strong eats”, governs the land and the people as the master, and overcomes the scattered autonomy and even the indigenous people through violent suppression. The state of centrifugal separatism, even the implementation of ethnic cleansing and cultural extinction (for example, the ancient civilization of the Indus Valley and its natives no longer exist after the Aryan conquest, and the Aryan-Indic people no longer exist after the Persian conquest. After the Mongolian conquest, Afghanistan has turned into a ghost territory” and the Buddhist culture has been extinct after the Muslim conquest. Today, the Taliban’s bombing of the Buddha is nothing more than its “finishing” work), or if you want to remain civilized and be kind, whether it is direct governance or Support for local agent governance, the most likely result is that it is difficult to pay extremely high governance costs, and finally had to withdraw.
So far, the only logically possible but practical exception is: if external forces are backed by completely asymmetric superpower to carry out civilized and direct governance, just as the United States did to Japan and its allies to Germany after World War II. Like this kind of occupational governance, it is possible to integrate a modern civilized country after a certain period of “compulsory civilized” transformation and then withdraw. But this damages the national self-esteem of local residents a lot, and it is also incompatible with the principles of modern international relations. Except in special circumstances such as the defeat of Germany and Japan in World War II, there is rarely such an opportunity.
However, if external forces do not want to withdraw, and do not want to get their hands dirty and directly carry out brutal governance, but instead want to support a certain local force to govern, it is still difficult to escape the dilemma mentioned above: If you completely treat the fostered as a puppet, do it yourself High-intensity comprehensive intervention (like the Japanese used Wang Jingwei back then) is actually similar to direct governance by oneself, and it still faces the problem of “non-toxic and non-husband”.
That’s how the Soviet Union supported the “red regime” in Afghanistan: without any elections, the Soviets would be the “master”. They were dissatisfied with Amin, so they sent troops to seize him and cut him off. Call him into exile in Moscow and order Najibullah to replace him. Before the Soviet Union decided to abandon the regime, a large number of Soviet experts operated various power departments, especially the intelligence department, which was commanded by 1,500 KGB officers and 25,000 Afghan employees, and the Afghan party could not intervene. (Note 2) Such a method is indeed effective: Existing research proves that if it were not for the Soviet reformers to wash their hands, they would continue to use such “dirty hands” to control Afghanistan, and the “jihadists” would not be able to help them. (Note 3) The Afghan “SS” trained in this way did have two lives until the Jalalabad battle in 1989 after the Soviet Union withdrew. They were still able to defeat the jihadists.
And if, for the sake of civilization, the local forces you foster are fully autonomous, and external forces not only provide military and economic assistance as allies, but not directly command as the master, then there is a question of whom to support. If this local power is an unscrupulous and unpredictable “iron fist”, the cost of supporting it will be very high (not only the expenditure of manpower and material resources, but also the loss of reputation) and there is also the risk of being backlashed (for example, when Vietnam supported the Khmer Rouge in the past) Today, Pakistan has the same risk of supporting the Taliban). But if it is gentle, self-limiting and weak, and external forces are only supported as allies, it may be of no avail. As a result, it will fall into a bottomless pit for the “unable to support the Adou” and eventually have to give up. This is the plight of the United States in Afghanistan.
Why did the “civilized conqueror” with stronger military fail, while the “barbaric conqueror” with weaker military succeeded?
In this way, we can understand what the so-called “cemetery of the empire” in Afghanistan is about: if it means that the mountains and rivers and humanities of Afghanistan make the locals strong in resisting aggression, then we cannot understand the paradox: why is it so long? In the era of traditional cold weapons, the external forces and the local forces are equally knives, guns and arrows, and the difference in force is not very different. At that time, “Afghanistan is under the iron hoof of foreign enemies. It is really uncommon.” In modern times, there is already a qualitative gap between the British and Russian mature and hot weapon armies and the transition from Afghanistan’s cold and hot weapons. On the contrary, Britain and Russia have not been able to annex Afghanistan.
——But the British aggression against Afghanistan lasted for 80 years, experienced three Anglo-Afghani wars, maintained the proxy regime several times, and obtained considerable returns (the Durand line that was beneficial to Britain was delineated, and the British In the “Great Game” of Russia, Afghanistan was relatively biased towards Britain, blocked British India, blocked Russia’s expansion, etc.). In contemporary times, the Soviet Union and the United States, which have experienced several military revolutions, are much stronger than the British forces in those days. The Mujahideen and Taliban in Afghanistan are basically still traditional tribal and sect armed forces, and they are no better than Barak. How powerful is the Zai Dynasty army. The difference in force should be said to be greater than that of the Anglo-Arab war. However, the Soviet-American intervention is more difficult to sustain than the United Kingdom back then, and the gains outweigh the gains. Why?
This is also true for the Soviet Union and the United States alone.
The strength of the Soviet army in the 1980s was not as strong as the US army, which had just won the Cold War in the 21st century and had more advanced equipment. The “jihadists” that the Soviet army has to deal with are all ethnic groups and factions who join forces to resist the Soviet Union. Its foreign aid also includes the openly supported United States, Pakistan, China, and Saudi Arabia (Islamic oil states such as Saudi Arabia). The Taliban that the US military wants to deal with is just a Pashtun militant fighting alone. Its foreign aid is only Pakistan, which is still half-dark. As far as equipment is concerned, the Taliban is no better than the previous jihadists. At least the “Stinger” missiles provided by the United States to the jihadists have never been used by the Taliban. Obviously, the strength of the Taliban is not greater than the sum of the previous jihadists. However, the Soviet Union doesn’t talk about democracy. It has a naked “master and servant” relationship with the Afghan puppet regime. If you don’t obey you, you will kill your whole family (for example, to Amin). This way, the barbaric master and servant can cooperate very closely. On the other hand, the United States has a loose relationship with its “democratic” Afghan allies, and there is almost no cooperation-the latter only knows what to do, but does nothing by itself, and the United States cannot give orders to it. The result is that the Soviet support to the Najibullah army is obviously much more effective than the US support to the Afghan Republican Army. So that the Najibullah army can persist for 3 years after the Soviet army withdrew, and the U.S. army even gave up the resistance completely before the U.S. army withdrew!
Obviously, in terms of strength of force, the United States is better than the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union is better than the British, and Afghanistan’s traditional external conquerors (from the Aryans to the Mongolians and Turks) are worse than the Soviet Union. , Britain is not as good as the traditional conqueror. Only in terms of defeating the native resistance, the above-mentioned conquerors with the worst armed forces are enough to deal with the backward native forces in Afghanistan. Both the traditional conquerors, Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States have successfully occupied Afghanistan. But after the conquest, to integrate the country and conduct effective governance, it seems that off-road is more effective. The Aryans, Mongolia, Turks, etc. succeeded, the United Kingdom did not succeed but gained gains, and the Soviet Union and the United States almost lost everything.
In this sense, Afghanistan is not so much an “imperial cemetery”, a “democratic cemetery”, or a “socialist cemetery” as it is a civilized cemetery. And the recent failure of the United States is not so much a failure of the United States or a failure of democracy, but rather a failure of civilization. This is not only a tragedy for the United States, but is it also a tragedy for Afghanistan? Just as Mr. Zhu Yongbiao said after reading Ansari’s book: The theme of Afghanistan’s history is not the history of Afghanistan’s resistance to foreign invaders, but the history of the confrontation between Afghan reform forces and conservative forces. The result is often the bloody failure of reform initiators and promoters. In the end, this finally created today’s Afghanistan.
But can history only be so? Although we cannot substitute for the Afghans to make choices, the lessons and reflections of a country’s history are not only a matter of that country, it should be the result of human thought. How can Afghanistan get out of this six reincarnation? I think I can make a few comments.
1. Tamim Ansali: “Irregular Games: Afghanistan’s Repeatedly Interrupted History”, Zhejiang People’s Publishing House, 2019, foreword.
2. HASSAN KAKAR, M. (1995). Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982. Berkeley: University of California Press. P.153-168
3. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/27/10-myths-about-afghanistan
Note: This article only represents the author’s own views.