The Indo-Pacific has rapidly become theglobal geopolitical and geoeconomic epicenterencompassing roughly two-thirds of the world‘s population, global GDP, and international maritime trade, as well as some of the planet’s most important strategic challenges.
By Indo-Pacific we generally mean a macro-region that extends from East Africa to West America – thus decentralizing the strategic importance of China – with important connotations normative (compliance with international law), strategic (application of the same), e commercial.
Precisely because of its importance, many countries have devoted increasing attention to this region over the past 15 years. Europe took on this strategic awareness late, but it is making up for lost ground: France started first with FONOP (freedom of navigation and overflight) operations in 2014, Germany and the Netherlands waited another six years, the United Kingdom and the European Union they only published specific policies in 2021.
This list seems to lack theItalia: nation focused on the Enlarged Mediterranean and therefore the only country in the G7 and NATO Quint apparently uninterested in the new international strategic-economic hub. In spite of appearances, however, the reality is different: Italy has been moving indirectly for several years and is interacting with the Indo-Pacific in a substantial way, as we will briefly discuss in this article.
The activism of Italian diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific
Rome’s diplomatic approach began 16 years ago. Indeed, in 2007 Italy became the “Dialogue Partner” of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF, comprising 18 states), ahead of Singapore, Germany, and Spain. Despite the great difficulties deriving first from the international economic crisis, and then from the Covid-19 pandemic, Italy has since then continued its slow but constant approach to the Indo-Pacific, despite the many changes of government and the many challenges of the enlarged Mediterranean.
In 2013 he entered into a strategic partnership with the Vietnam. Moreover, over the past five years, the transition from Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific (far from being a mere change of nomenclature) has represented a renewed awareness of the new challenges to international order and law, a condition which has favored greater involvement also from Italy.
In 2018 Rome concludes a new strategic partnership with South Korea. The following year he became “Dialogue Partner” of theIndian Ocean Rim Association (IORA, comprising 23 states). In 2020, a further important agreement takes shape, the one with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN, 10 States), as Development Partner.
In 2021, an important Italy-India-Japan trilateral platform is created to support the international order. Finally, in 2023, the Meloni government successfully reaps the fruits of the diplomatic efforts of the past years, not only by relaunching the strategic partnership with Abu Dhabibut by signing two strategic partnerships of great importance with Tokyo and with New Delhi.
The first allows, among other things, to develop the GCAP program; the second was signed a few days ago – after the Italian Prime Minister co-inaugurated the Welcome to Dialogue 2023 – and was accompanied by a new defense agreement. Italy’s intense diplomatic work is therefore increasingly evident, both in numerical and qualitative terms.
Trade and security
If, on the one hand, Italy has favored political-diplomatic means in its approach to the Indo-Pacific, on the other there are further elements which contribute to strengthening the “Italian pivot” towards this macro-region.
Despite the serious and prolonged repercussions of the international economic crisis and the most recent pandemic, the trade of Italy with the countries of the Indo-Pacific has followed a markedly positive trajectory. According to the latest data from the UN, trade with the ten largest trading powers in the Indo-Pacific has grown by more than a sixth in the last 10 years.
An even more robust trend for Italian defense exports, which grew by almost 50% in the same period according to SIPRI data. Then there are recent projects of enormous proportions: the creation of a new class of frigates for both the US and Indonesia, and the development of the GCAP project – in equal partnership with the UK and Japan – for the creation of a military aircraft of the sixth generation, which will probably become the subject of exports to various partners.
In addition to commercial interests, Italy is also engaged in the field of (trans)regional security. This is because the Wider Mediterranean and the Indo-Pacific intersect in the western quadrants of the latter, more specifically in the Western Indian Ocean, an area in which Italy has been engaged for many years with leading roles in multilateral missions (EU is born).
Furthermore, until a few weeks ago, Italy was in command of the EU’s Operation AGENOR, active in the Strait of Hormuz, while in the coming months Rome will send the Morosini ship on a patrol and training mission in the Indo-Pacific, together with the navies of various partner countries. This last mission will therefore represent a broader and more multilateral evolution of the Indo-Pacific tour carried out by the Carabiniere ship in 2017.
Towards an official foreign policy?
The growing quantity and the considerable weight of the Italian commitment in this region – from a diplomatic, commercial, and strategic point of view – and Rome’s credentials – therefore lay solid foundations for the formulation of an official strategy of Italy for the Indo- Pacific, on a par with what has already been done by other allies and by the EU itself.
By virtue of cardinal principles of Italian foreign policy – multilateralism, respect for international law, propensity for dialogue – the potential Italian strategy would take on very specific characteristics, focusing more on soft power (diplomacy, politics, commerce, science, culture) and on hard power, in the latter case limited to occasional FONOP missions, probably carried out in a multilateral context.
This would place it close to the objectives and means of the EU (as implicitly stated), Germany, the Netherlands, and partially France, with a certain strategic distance (and complementarity) towards the Anglosphere strategies of the US, the UK, and Australia.
If and when this official policy will materialize at the moment is not known. In the meantime, however, a crucial aspect should be highlighted: the objectives, the means, and the rhetoric of countries like Italy are entirely compatible with those of most of the Indo-Pacific nations (and of ASEAN itself). This can only represent a promising start for the recent but increasingly intense Italian approach, since it is developing in full respect of the common interests not only of Europe, but of the Indo-Pacific itself.
Cover photo ANSA/ FILIPPO ATTILI – GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE