The idea that the pandemic represents a historical caesura of the first magnitude has always left me perplexed. Important parenthesis, of course; accelerator of processes already in progress, in all probability; but macroscopic turning point, in my opinion, no. That the Ukrainian crisis could profoundly change our world, on the other hand, is a hypothesis that seems much more likely to me. For heaven’s sake: we are just at the beginning and we don’t have the faintest idea of how it will end. If this conflict were to prove to be the beginning of the end of Putin’s rule, for example, we could perhaps close it too in parentheses: an important season but all in all limited in time. This is what basically hopes those who emphasize the presumed “madness” of the President of the Russian Federation, imagining (under the illusion?) That the war is due to the psychopathology of a single individual, and that it is therefore sufficient to eliminate him to restore a “normal” condition of peace, stability and rationality. But if, on the contrary, the Russian challenge remains with us for a long time, the chances that the current crisis will prove to be a real historical watershed will increase.
But if that were the case, if the conflict with Russia were to continue, how would our democracies be changed? What would be the effects on the internal politics of Western countries? Said so brutally it sounds bad, but the truth is that the presence of an enemy is very convenient for democracy. The reason is rather intuitive: based as they are on consent and individual freedom, democracies naturally tend to generate centrifugal dynamics. To disunite, in short. And the presence of a threat then serves to counterbalance this tendency, to reunify and recompose. After 9/11, and for a few years, this function was carried out by radical Islam. Over the past decade, in the absence of external enemies, an internal danger has risen to the fore, so-called populism. And for the past two years, there has been the virus. All occasions for a strong call to mobilization, order, cognitive and behavioral discipline. Within days of its inception, the Ukrainian war is already exerting robust centripetal political and cultural pressure on the democratic West. If this pressure were to last over time, its first effect would be that of a return of power. Since 1989, power has essentially been exorcised by an optimistic, “neo-Panglossian” culture, convinced that the planet was now on a sort of inclined plane such that there would no longer be too much need to guide, defend or to impose, because the automatic mechanisms of law, economics and technology would spontaneously produce their own marvelous effects of progress. From 2001 onwards, history has given the neo-panglossism terrifying slaps that have stunned but not knocked out. In a modified form that I would call “soteriological catastrophism” (“we are on the brink of the abyss, but if you do well we will come out better and stronger”) was robustly present throughout the pandemic. We will now see if the Russian challenge will lead us to a completely different paradigm. What is certain, for the moment, is that since February 24, words related to power such as “sovereignty”, “strength”, “national interest”, “security”, “defense” have come back to the fore. And the word “fear” has come back to the fore. It has often been said that so-called populisms feed fears and then take advantage of them politically. It has always seemed to me a scarcely profitable way (although very much in line with neo-panglossism) of dealing with the populist question. Fear is a very real emotion, and within certain limits it is necessary, indeed even beneficial. Leaving the fear to the populists was a mistake in the past. But from today it is no longer possible. As has already happened for some time in France under the blows of Islamist terrorism, also in the other democracies the political establishment will have to respond to a request for protection which it has so far looked at with great caution and even a little suspicion. It is clear that the need for power to which the Ukrainian conflict has restored weight and urgency, especially when viewed from Italy, cannot be satisfied other than in a framework of Euro-Atlantic cooperation. In short, it is possible that the political divisions of the last decade, and in particular that between pro-Europeans or, more generally, multilateralists on the one hand and sovereignists on the other, already partially filled by the pandemic, are destined to become less and less relevant in the near future, and that politics tends rather to gather in a central zone marked by multilateralism – but by a realistic and muscular multilateralism. In short, an area marked by such an anxiety about security that will push the debate on who this security should provide it, whether the State or the alliances between States, into the background.
Two quick final comments. That naturally centrifugal democracies regroup in the face of a threat can be positive, as long as the disciplinary thrust of the re-compacting process does not exceed on the opposite side. The pandemic has posed this problem. The clash with Russia is already posing it, and, if it should last, it will increasingly pose it in the future. It is quite possible, and it would be very opportune, to face the aggression against Ukraine with due energy but without blaming conductors, famous soprano or literary giants who have been dead for a century and a half. The unattainable rate of hysteria, the inexhaustible thirst for indignation of our democracies are not friends of freedom. Nor are they serious, finally. In all likelihood, this crisis will force us to make a very painful revision of the energy, trade and defense policy, which will involve costs and sacrifices. It wouldn’t hurt if we calmed down a little and started preparing.