The Cutro tragedy reminded us in the worst possible way that migrations are, together with the environmental emergency, the priority issue of Italian and European politics. On these occasions, many recognize it, but few, very few act accordingly.
Politics, especially the Italian one, constantly focuses on the problem of you land. On the one hand there are those who would like to eliminate them, on the other hand those who wish for their more “humanitarian” management. However, it is enough to look up a little to understand that the landings are only a symptom of a much more serious and complex disease. Few data are enough to realize this.
The reasons for migrations
Scrolling through the pages of Stephen Smith’s book, with the premonitory title Escape to Europe. Young Africa towards the old continentwe find many. First the demographic factor: Africa today has a population that is about double that of Europe and by 2050 it will be more than triple. The average age of Africans is 19, that of Europeans is 45. Moving on to socio-economic conditions, 400 million inhabitants in Africa suffer from malnutrition100 million children are anemic and 60% of them will not have healthy development. The 10 countries with the lowest GDP per capita in the world are all located in Africa and of the last 50, 35 are south of the Mediterranean. While among the top 50 countries in the world for per capita wealth there is no African state.
Finally, on the political level, according to Freedom House, out of 52 African states, 5 have a democratic government, 20 are only partially so, while 27 are classified as non-democratic. Nearly half of the armed conflicts currently underway take place in Africa.
Taking these data into account, it is therefore no wonder that today 32% of young African graduates intend to emigrate and, looking ahead, it is estimated that by 2050 there will be around 200 million people of African descent living in Europe.
It is evident that we are faced with an epochal phenomenon of such dimensions and characteristics, that there is no physical barrier that will be able to contain the growing flow of migrants, who from the South of the world – especially from Africa – are directed to Europe. So unless borders are to be militarized by allowing the use of weapons to repel arrivals, tragedies like Cutro’s are bound to recur at an incremental rate.
There is only one alternative to this humanitarian emergency: launch serious and effective policies to promote sustainable development and democracy in the global South. Only by reducing the enormous inequalities which separate ‘rich and secure’ Europe from ‘poor and insidious’ Africa can we hope to contain the exodus.
The index of the quality of development aid
What is being done in this direction? Unfortunately not much, even in Italy. And this despite European border countries like ours having a strong interest in the theme of development promotion taken seriously, instead of focusing almost obsessively on the subject of push-backs at borders and returns.
Let’s start with the financial aspects. Since the 1970s, within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the most developed countries have made a commitment to bring the share of public aid for development (Ops) to 0.7% of their respective gross domestic products. However, to date only a few of the 30 OECD donor countries have reached that threshold (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Germany and Luxembourg) and the overall percentage has never reached more than 0.4%. Currently the Ops are around, in absolute terms, around $150 billion a year. However, these funds must be divided among 141 countries, of which, in particular, 46 are considered the least developed of all (LDC’s – with a per capita GDP of around 1 dollar a day), and correspond to almost one billion people; and 36 lower-middle-income (Lic’s – with per capita GDP of less than $4.1 a day).
Turning to the operational plan, not all official development aid goes to developing countries (pvs). This happens because a significant share of development support corresponds to the so-called tied help (tied aid), i.e. contributions through which donor countries finance companies and national bodies operating in the South of the world. It is estimated that around 50% of bilateral development cooperation agreements (which represent a third of the total Ops) are tied aid.
Another factor to consider is represented by the so-called inflated aid. These correspond to items of expenditure which are included in the overall budget of development cooperation, but which in reality concern aspects which have only marginally to do with the fight against poverty in the world. In particular, many donor countries include funds relating to refugee management among those for development support. Thus Italy, which seemed to have gone from the percentage of GDP for Ops from 0.23% in 2020 to 0.29% in 2021. In reality, by eliminating the expenses for migration policies, the share of development support fell back to 0.22%.
More generally, the majority of donor states, and in particular those which in absolute terms contribute the most to official development assistance, do not shine for their efficiency in achieving the objectives they set out to achieve. In this regard, from a multi-year survey on the quality of spending on Ops (QuODA—the Quality of ODA), in which 4 indicators in particular are taken into account (prioritization, partnership, transparency and competitiveness, pursuit of objectives), various Countries, including Italy, are decidedly inefficient in implementing their support policies.
L’European Unionas known, is by far the development support leader. In fact, together with the Member States, its contribution amounts to over 43% of the total public aid to developing countries. Furthermore, since the seventies with the Lome Conventions before and with the Cotonou Agreement from 2003 to 2020, it operates through multilateral structures to implement development promotion strategies in a constant and coordinated way in countries in need of support, particularly in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP countries).
The difficulties of Brussels on cooperation
This framework is in crisis today. More than two years after the expiry of the Cotonou Convention (the bilateral treaty between the EU and the ACP for the integration of these countries into the world economy), the European Union is unable to obtain ratification of the new multilateral instrument which should guide the development cooperation for the next 20 years, i.e. the so-called Post-Cotonou Convention. The agreement, which involves 79 ACP countries, requires ratification by all member states to enter into force, including Hungary opposes because he would more restrictive rules precisely in the matter of migrants . And this despite the fact that the new Convention contains provisions that are more advanced than in the past in this area. In particular, the obligation for the ACP countries to repatriate irregular immigrants present in the European territory.
More generally, even with the entry into force of the post-Cotonou Convention the overall picture should not change significantly. Indeed, in some respects it could even get worse. European development support will no longer be guaranteed by the current one European Development Fund, conceived as an ad hoc mechanism for the needs of developing countries, but through Global Europe. This is a new instrument with which the main external activities of the EU will be financed (neighborhood policy, support for human rights, development cooperation). Multiple goals about which ACP country representatives have raised concerns. The same attitude of mistrust also applies to the commercial partnership agreements, which will be untied from the post-Cotonou system.
New Cotonou: nothing new
But the most disappointing aspect concerns the whole structure of the new Convention with the ACP countries and of EU development cooperation more generally. Apart from the financial aspect, which in any case sees Europe overall remaining well below the 0.7% target, on the political level there is no significant change from the past. The democratic conditionality clause remains vague and not very applicable, there are no significant commitments in the field of scientific and technological transfer, only generic affirmations appear on the entrepreneurial level. On the other hand, ample space is reserved for the clauses concerning migrations, with respect to which there is not a full sharing of orientation between the EU and the ACP countries.
In general, therefore, the scenario that emerges is unsatisfactory and not at all reassuring. In the sense that, if the commitment described is the profuse commitment of European donors to foster processes of growth and emancipation, particularly for Africa, it is not to be expected that the migratory drive will slow downon the contrary, the more realistic expectation is that it will increase further.
Copertina EPA/OLIVIER HOSLET / POOL’s photo