The Italian summer will be very hot, very short, very bad. But beyond the climate, and for those who do not want to spend August talking about micro alliances and are interested in social and economic problems, what will we talk about in this electoral campaign? For decades, at least since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and then the Stability and Growth Pact, the space for national economic policy has narrowed.
Unless we propose Italy’s exit from the European Union – and no party, when the Union assigns us 191.5 billion to spend on investments, dreams of putting this suicide in its program – who will win the elections will face a path already written. On the one hand, it will have to put into practice the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (Pnrr), in order to obtain the tranches of financing subsequent to the 46 billion already collected (changes to the Plan can be proposed, but would not be welcomed by Brussels); on the other hand, in the event of market turbulence that causes the difference in yield (spread) between Italian and German bonds to grow excessively, it will have to submit to the additional supervision provided for by the new European Central Bank (ECB) shield, launched on the day of the fall of Mario Draghi’s government and of which Italy will probably be the first test.
But it would be wrong to assume that, at this point, there is no room for two (or more) economic policy options. Or that, worse, we are at the usual re-edition of the derby among the moderate-Europeanists-realists – who roughly propose themselves as the guarantors of the European establishment in Italy, ignoring their former social base and the sufferings of those who do not reach the end month – and the populist right in the permanent election campaign, which interprets that unease with promises of expenses and reliefs that it cannot keep. It would be wrong because a lot has changed since 2018, in Europe and in Italy.
Seen from Europe, the Italian electoral campaign is dangerous. But this time not only and not so much for Italy, but for Europe itself. Which with difficulty, and with continuous risks of going back, has given itself active budgetary instruments with the Next generation EU plan (the framework within which the Pnrr is), financed with an embryo of common debt very hindered and badly seen by northern hawks; and confirmed a shield of solidarity against speculation, after the “whatever it takes” of 26 July 2012 (exactly ten years ago), this too still to be tested and strengthened.
It is not only Italy that European aid and money are at stake; but also the European Union which, if Italy gives up, is playing the possibility of moving forward on a federal, supportive and progressive path, in whose extremely difficult construction the Italian leadership should play a role, weaving the right alliances and putting forward feasible proposals . The pushes to defend only the national interests of the strongest are always present, and will increase in times of crisis; It would be singular and tragic if even the weak, like us, were associated with these pressures: a bit as if the poor voted for parties that propose to cut taxes on the rich, as unfortunately happened more than once from Donald Trump to Matteo Salvini.
Reversing the point of view, however, it is not true that the Italian game is played only in Europe. Admitted to keep the commitments of the PNRR, and the related cash flow, and to remain protected under the new shield of the ECB, the weakest heir of Draghi’s bazooka, much remains to be done, and it will all be our sack.
The famous reforms have to be done, starting with the fiscal one: the Draghi government, governed by forced national solidarity, had presented a very timid and reticent fiscal delegation law on many points, starting with the land registry reform, a classic example of an upside-down reality in which poor small owners are convinced of the goodness of a situation that benefits only the large owners of luxury homes undervalued by the land registry.
Then there is the superbonus to be reviewed, poorly written and implemented worse, even here to avoid a redistribution from Robin Hood backwards, from those who have less to those who have more. While, the Bank of Italy Household Budget Survey reiterated a few days ago, the index of wealth inequality in Italy continues to grow.
And again: it is necessary to defend and review the citizenship income, which, certified by Istat, has saved half a million families from poverty. And there is the minimum wage, on which the unions should be shaken, avoiding to defend with national contracts a status quo that penalizes millions of underpaid and non-contractual workers.
To these “old” issues are added the new emergencies of inflation and the climate crisis, closely connected given that the increase in prices comes largely from the costs of fossil energy. If we think that the fight against inflation is not to be entrusted only to the European Central Bank – with continuous rate increases that in turn would throw us into recession – we need to find space for national and supranational policies and prices.
For example, by encouraging public goods and consumption instead of energy-intensive private ones; targeting construction incentives exclusively for this purpose; redesigning the places and times of work in this perspective, after the pandemic. These are only hints, limited and certainly not exhaustive: but isn’t this what it would be worth talking about, in the short but decisive electoral campaign that awaits us?