[Epoch Times November 05, 2021]Recently, the US Department of Defense released the 2021 CCP military power report entitled “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China.” This 173-page report is informative and informative, expounding all aspects of the CCP’s military power.
This report seldom uses the CCP’s “Strategy and Capability Development in the Taiwan Strait” as its topic, and specifically discusses the current biggest hot spot of Taiwan Strait security issues, which is quite eye-catching.
Increased possibility of the Chinese Communist Party using force against Taiwan
The report described that although the CCP publicly claimed that Taiwan was peacefully reunified, it never promised to renounce the use of force. The CCP has many options for military actions against Taiwan, ranging from air and sea blockade to full-scale amphibious invasion to seize and occupy part or all of Taiwan or its offshore islands.
The report analyzes that as long as the CCP believes that reunification with Taiwan can be carried out through long-term negotiations, it seems willing to postpone the use of force. After all, the cost of conflict is greater than the benefit.
The report described that in January 2019, Xi Jinping publicly reiterated that the CCP refused to abandon the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue and proposed a “one country, two systems” model to demonstrate its position of peaceful reunification. In 2020, the leaders of the Communist Party of China repeated the content of Xi Jinping’s 2019 speech.
According to the current public opinion in Taiwan, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party may think that the window of opportunity to conquer Taiwan under the guise of the “one country, two systems” framework is about to close. The CCP is increasingly taking measures to increase pressure on Taiwan, continuing military operations near Taiwan, and training for emergencies in Taiwan, which may indicate that the CCP’s military needs to develop and improve its related strategies and capabilities more urgently. .
The report quoted Article 8 of the CCP’s Anti-Secession Law: If “the separatist forces…cause the fact that Taiwan separates from China”; or “a major event leading to the secession of Taiwan’s country” occurs; or if “the possibility of peaceful reunification” occurs Sex has been exhausted; the CCP may choose to use force against Taiwan. According to the analysis of the report, the CCP uses such unspecified strategic vagueness to increase the flexibility of its options.
As a professional and authoritative report of the US Department of Defense, listing this topic separately in 2021 is tantamount to an obvious hint that the possibility of the Chinese Communist Party using force against Taiwan has greatly increased.
On November 3, the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mark Milley, stated that the CCP is developing its ability to invade Taiwan. Months, 12 months, maybe 24 months”; for defending Taiwan, “we are absolutely capable, no doubt.”
Milli’s statement, like the 2021 CCP’s military power report, can be regarded as a deterrent to the CCP’s risk of attacking Taiwan.
Different options for the CCP to use force against Taiwan
The report believes that the CCP has a series of options. It can either send a signal to use force against Taiwan or take punitive actions to coerce Taiwan into submission, or it can take more comprehensive military actions. If the CCP uses force against Taiwan, it will have to try to prevent potential US intervention. If a protracted conflict occurs, the CCP may choose to upgrade the cyber, space or nuclear war to try to end the conflict, or it may choose to fight to a deadlock and seek a political solution.
The CCP can activate different military options individually or in combination, including air and sea blockades, limited military operations, air and missile attacks, and large-scale amphibious invasions.
The report quoted an article by the CCP’s army, saying that the CCP could conduct a naval and air traffic blockade against Taiwan to force Taiwan to surrender. Along with the joint blockade, the CCP may also carry out large-scale missile attacks and seize the islands offshore Taiwan, and also try to make Taiwan surrender quickly. Such blockade operations may last for several weeks or months. The CCP may also conduct electronic warfare, cyber attacks, and information operations at the same time to isolate the Taiwan authorities and people and control the international narrative of the conflict.
The CCP may also take limited military actions to weaken the effectiveness or legitimacy of the Taiwan authorities, including computer networks or limited kinetic energy attacks on Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure, in order to trigger fear in Taiwan and reduce the impact of Taiwan’s citizens. The confidence of the leader. The CCP’s special operations forces may also infiltrate Taiwan and attack infrastructure or leaders.
If the CCP further expands its military operations, it may carry out missile attacks and air strikes on Taiwan, including air bases, radar stations, missiles, space assets, and communication facilities, in order to weaken Taiwan’s defense capabilities and weaken the position of Taiwan’s leader and the determination of the Taiwan people.
The report believes that the CCP’s most risky action should be to launch a large-scale amphibious invasion of Taiwan. In 2020, the CCP conducted a joint amphibious assault exercise near Taiwan, and the CCP also continued to build capabilities that would facilitate a full-scale invasion; in 2019, the CCP completed the construction of its first Type 075 amphibious assault ship.
The report analyzes that a large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complex and difficult military operations, requiring air and sea superiority, and the rapid establishment and maintenance of uninterrupted support for land replenishment. The attempt to invade Taiwan may strain the deployment of the CCP’s armed forces and invite international intervention. These pressures, coupled with the depletion of the CCP’s military power, as well as the complexity of urban warfare and the elimination of resistance, even if they can land, will become a major political and military risk for Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party.
The report describes that apart from regular training, the CCP has almost no public military preparations for Taiwan. The CCP may also attack Taiwan’s small islands, such as Dongsha Island or Taiping Island in the South China Sea. It may also attack medium-sized islands such as Matsu or Kinmen with better defenses to demonstrate military capabilities, political determination, and at the same time show a certain degree of restraint. However, such actions involve significant and possibly prohibitive political risks, which may stimulate Taiwan’s independence and arouse strong international opposition.
What preparations did the CCP army do
The report believes that one of the primary goals of the CCP’s military reforms that began in 2015 is to build an army capable of complex joint operations, including an army that will participate in Taiwan’s emergency operations. The CCP established the Eastern Theater District to streamline and improve the planning and preparation capabilities for joint military operations across the Taiwan Strait.
In 2016, the CCP established a strategic support force and a joint logistics support force to coordinate joint logistics and material delivery. This may improve the CCP’s ability to support emergencies in Taiwan; however, the CCP may still be exploring and integrating the command and coordination process.
The report analyzes that the CCP’s invasion of Taiwan may include extensive amphibious operations, army aviation, and air assault operations. In recent years, the CCP’s ground forces’ training for cross-sea amphibious assaults may be the top priority. The Chinese Marine Corps has 6 brigades, 4 of which are deployed near Taiwan and 2 are in the southern theater. The CCP’s amphibious assault training activities in 2020 include: night loading, concealed landing, helicopter cross-sea airdrop, special forces infiltration, electronic warfare, armored and mechanized infantry joint landing operations. News reports also claimed to use unmanned systems at sea, in the air, and on the ground to support amphibious assault operations.
The report describes that in the past five years, the CCP Army and Marine Corps have deployed amphibious combat equipment, such as the ZBD-05 amphibious infantry fighting vehicle and the PLZ-07B amphibious self-propelled howitzer, but the CCP rarely engages in amphibious operations involving echelons above the battalion. exercise. The CCP also reorganized its airborne army and used the Y-20 large transport aircraft for airborne training for the first time.
The report believes that the Chinese Communist Navy is improving its air defense, anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare capabilities to attack the Taiwan Navy in cross-strait conflicts and perform different tasks. The CCP’s new attack submarines, modern surface combat ships with air defense capabilities, and fourth-generation naval fighters are designed to achieve maritime superiority within the first island chain, as well as to deter and counter potential third-party interference in the conflict in Taiwan. However, the CCP has recently focused on regional and eventually global expeditions, and has not increased a large number of large tank landing ships and medium-sized landing craft.
The CCP’s Air Force has purchased a large number of advanced aircraft that can fight against Taiwan, as well as many long-range air defense systems to defend against key military installations or population centers in mainland China.
The CCP Rocket Force is ready to launch missile attacks on high-value targets such as Taiwan’s command and control facilities, air force bases, and radar stations. The CCP’s nuclear missile force may also be on high alert in order to prepare for a rapid nuclear counterattack.
Taiwan’s defense capabilities
The report assesses that the CCP’s decades of military modernization efforts are continuously expanding the capability gap with Taiwan’s military. In order to bridge the gap and improve its defense capabilities, Taiwan is developing new concepts and new capabilities for asymmetric warfare.
Important measures taken by Taiwan include the establishment of war reserve stocks, expansion of the national defense industry base, enhancement of joint operations and crisis response capabilities, and strengthening of the ranks of officers and non-commissioned officers; but these improvements can only partially solve national defense challenges. Taiwan’s 2021 national defense assessment reiterated the adjustment of its defense strategy, focusing on protecting its coastal and near-shore coastal areas in multi-level defense in depth, emphasizing the enhancement of asymmetric and joint capabilities, and relying more on the Taiwan Air Force through multi-domain deterrence measures. And the navy.
The Taiwan military is currently serving 188,000 people. In addition to its personnel disadvantages, Taiwan also faces challenges in equipment and combat readiness. In 2019, Taiwan’s defense budget increased by 5.2% to US$11.6 billion; in 2020, it will increase by another 10%, accounting for more than 2% of GDP. Taiwan is working hard to develop asymmetric combat capabilities, with key areas including electronic warfare, cyber and information operations, rapid attack on maritime vessels, coastal defense missiles, rapid mine deployment, unmanned aerial systems and critical infrastructure protection.
The report describes that the United States adheres to the one-China policy guided by the “Taiwan Relations Act”, the three joint communiqu Security partners; the United States will continue to support the peaceful settlement of cross-strait issues to meet the wishes and best interests of the people of Taiwan.
According to the report, the United States has enabled Taiwan to maintain sufficient self-defense capabilities by providing defense equipment and services to maintain peace, security, and stability in the Taiwan Strait. In 2019, Taiwan spent 8 billion U.S. dollars to purchase F-16V fighter jets; in 2020, the total military sales to Taiwan exceeded 5 billion U.S. dollars; including advanced UAV systems, long-range missiles and artillery, and Harpoon anti-ship missile systems. Since 2010, the United States has sold more than 23 billion U.S. dollars in arms to Taiwan.
Concluding remarks
Looking at the report’s analysis of the situation across the Taiwan Strait, it is believed that military risks across the Taiwan Strait are increasing. Although the CCP’s ability and preparation for a full-scale attack on Taiwan are not sufficient, the possibility of limited conflict always exists.
The report concludes by describing that the United States will continue to maintain the ability to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion to prevent threats to the security, social or economic system of the people of Taiwan.
Such a statement means that the United States has promised to defend Taiwan in order to deter the CCP’s military adventures. This should also be one of the purposes of this report to separately discuss the situation across the Taiwan Strait.
——The Epoch Times debut
Editor in charge: Gao Yi
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