The Italian debate on the limits on the circulation of cash suffers from the “eternal evil” that afflicts public policy choices: that of the permanent emergency. With the tax revenue pipes leaking much more water than those of the aqueducts – and with a policy that, historically, is only able to conceive very short-term measures – it is not surprising that the issue is reduced to excessive and therefore useless vulgarizations.
On the one hand, we are witnessing the usual simplistic Manichean radicalization launched by social network users and amplified by the professional media, this time in the version of “evaders against virtuous citizens” or “autonomous against employees”. On the other hand, public power navigates between Scilla (the need for coherence with respect to “instances of freedom”) and Charybdis (the need to let “real money” enter the state coffers) risking sinking into the vortexes unleashed by the one and on the other. Even in such a context, therefore, there is little time and little desire to reflect in terms of the system and ask questions about the umpteenth effect disruptive caused by the unscrupulous diffusion of information technologies and by the strict control that Big Tech exercises over the sector.
While the debate drags on confusedly in the name of “in my opinion” and the decontextualized citation of studies, statistics and impromptu criminological analyzes on corruption phenomena and various tax illegalities, what should be the main object of political action remains out of focus: decide who owns the wealth produced by work (self-employed or employee, it doesn’t matter).
As I explain in an academic article published in unsuspecting times, the control of wealth is one of the attributes of the sovereign state. The exclusive right to “mint money” and the right to recognize and limit the right to private property are two means by which states maintain control over subsidiaries. This explains why in Italy they cannot, indeed, could not, exist private currency, because instead a project (albeit failed) like Libra was born in the USA where private currencies are part of local anthropology and because cryptocurrencies, before becoming the object of speculation, were born to anarchically claim individual freedom from public control over wealth.
In summary, as long as a state maintains exclusive control over “what” constitutes wealth and how it is circulated, the associates have no alternative but to submit to the rules imposed by the decision-maker who, at any time, can “give” and can ” remove”. It is not just a question of the coercive power of taxation but also of the one on the basis of which to control the legal tender of a currency. Those who lived through the “night of the Euro” will remember the change in psychological perception with respect to Lire banknotes in various denominations at the stroke of midnight: from objects that represented wealth they suddenly became waste paper or, at most, collectible.
Then come the e-commerce platforms that take the concept of “voucher” to the extreme and video games with the possibility of buying prop and, subsequently, “credits” or other “titles” to obtain, weapons or other gadgets for your character or for the environment in which it moves (including the madness of “buying a house in the metaverse”).
The common feature of these phenomena is that the transactions consist of “real money” in exchange for a credit right, i.e. the commitment taken on by a private entity to honor the request for a consideration against the offer of “virtual currency” (in this case, the adjective is absolutely appropriate) “guaranteed” by the platform owner. The situation is identical to that which occurs when using payment cards (and credit cards, in particular): using a dematerialized system under the control of a private entity (banks or companies that issue payment cards) means, first of all, forcing a person to cede his individual wealth incorporated in the banknotes to a third party (not to the State, therefore), who in exchange “promises” that the paper will work as a currency.
It is therefore clear that the issue of using the POS does not concern (only) that of commissions on microtransactions or the ubiquitous, hypocritical and stale “privacy alarm”, but rather the strategic decision, therefore long-term and therefore of zero interest for politicians and commentators, on “who” must be the owner of the product of one’s work. As mentioned, the birth of cryptocurrencies is —at least initially— an answer to this question: Bitcoin is a way to remove the circulation of value and wealth from state control. So, incidentally, the reason why cryptocurrencies should be outlawed is their ability to undermine state sovereignty and not because they allow money laundering or other forms of criminal actions. It is a fact of common experience, in fact, that the fiscal and corporate engineering operations made possible also by the existence of tax havens or by highly unbalanced tax regimes already allow very efficient delinquently results.
Even cryptocurrencies, however, have returned to the ranks and from a worldly ideological banner they have become an instrument of financial speculation. They help to extend the scope of the “wealth credit” system; that is, the replacement of individual property with a credit right not against the State or the banking system (which, despite everything, is still regulated) but in favor of private companies. Formally, these are “simple” platforms – gaming, social networking or any other digital service – but in reality they accumulate substance (or rather, “substance”) in exchange for the ephemeral availability of access to something, as long as it lasts or as long as one can afford to pay.
Big Tech has had and increasingly has a role in the “crediting” of wealth: in theory, indeed, in practice, a person could own “everything” without having anything: cars, houses, computers, work tools, music, videos , books – and soon also clothes and other essential components of daily life – but above all currency e identification are available as a service. This is the perfect kit for the “digital nomad” who is today in Cinque Terre, tomorrow in Tijuana and the day after tomorrow in Okotoks. All that is needed is an account – not even a tablet or a computer – to access the personal credit portfolio that allows him to open the “smart lock” of the new “smart home”, turn on the “smart appliances” and drive the “smart mobile”. Everything, of course, until the “nomad” is able to guarantee access to the “system” by paying the equivalent of nothing in hard cash obtained with real work. It is the end of the (role of) the right to property and its social function: that of building stability and therefore collective growth.
This scenario – already real – suggests that a public debate on the dematerialisation of payments should also address the problem of the long-term consequences of political choices perhaps capable of giving some immediate results, but certainly capable of destroying, in the long run, the of our society itself. This is why it is rather short-sighted to set the discussion on class struggle and the conflict between social groups, keeping alive categories that facts and the economy have already consigned to history, while Big Tech takes over our world and our lives undisturbed.