Vladimir Putin’s rule is not as strong as it was before the start of the war in Ukraine.
In less than a year, on March 17, 2024, Russians will go to the presidential elections. Given the current social and political conditions in the country, few doubt that Vladimir Putin will not easily win a sixth term. According to some Russian media, Putin’s team plans to ensure that the president receives more than the record 77 percent of the vote, which he won in the 2018 elections, Foreign Affair writes.
In theory, this goal should be easy to achieve. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is widely supported in the country, and a poll by the independent Levada Center shows that Putin’s approval rating is at an all-time high. The Kremlin dominates the Russian media and can easily arrest or otherwise silence any critic. Russian-controlled opposition groups, malleable political parties authorized by the Kremlin to field anti-Putin candidates, never again endorsed the president. As things stand now, it is unlikely that they will propose a presidential candidate who can take even a modest share of the vote. They can actually join the Kremlin from the outside to ensure that Putin achieves the desired electoral percentage.
Putin is more vulnerable than people think
But today in Moscow there is little certainty about the future. The war has plunged Russia into a period of general unpredictability in which no one feels safe, and it is impossible for policymakers to come up with even short-term plans. They leaked recently recordings of a conversation between famous Russian music producer Joseph Prigozhin and former MP Farad Ahmedov, showing that both are furious with the Russian leadership and believe that the country’s policy makers lack the capacity to make key decisions. They also claimed that several of Russia’s most powerful people, including the head of the National Guard, were plotting against Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.. Their statements represent what Russian elites are saying to each other, thinking no one is listening, and suggesting that the level of discontent is high.
A significant military escalation could exacerbate those feelings and dramatically complicate Putin’s ability to maintain control of the country. If Moscow carries out further mobilization – something it has so far avoided – it will cause even greater social anxiety with unpredictable consequences. If Russia faces further military setbacks, Putin will have to deal with increasingly loud criticism. Either situation could lead him to cancel elections, introduce elements of a military dictatorship and purge elites in an attempt to strengthen the security of his position. This could encourage Russian elites to challenge the regime. The Kremlin may be convinced that Putin will win another election by a landslide, which is currently the most likely outcome. But the war has made Putin more vulnerable than most people in Russia realize.
Preparations for a new mobilization?
It is easy to see how Russia could end up escalating military operations in Ukraine. Kiev is preparing a full counteroffensive this spring that will target Russian positions across the battlefield. Ukraine is also carrying out sabotage and drone attacks on Russian military facilities and may decide to start shelling Russian border areas. One of Russia’s most popular pro-war military bloggers was killed in an explosion in St. Petersburg on April 2, proving that no one is safe. Each of these attacks could prompt Moscow to increase its investment in the war, lest it lose more territory and further embarrass itself.
In theory, Russia could escalate the conflict without affecting the lives of its own citizens. Moscow could, for example, step up attacks on critical Ukrainian infrastructure or try to assassinate members of the Ukrainian leadership. But if her losses are severe enough, Russia will probably be forced to do what it did after Ukraine routed Russian troops in the Kharkiv region: announce a new mobilization and recruit hundreds of thousands of people to fight. It seems that Russia is already preparing for such a possibility. In more than 40 regions, recruiting office officials send “background check” invitations to men who are eligible for mobilization.
The thugs want to stifle the remaining freedoms
The last mobilization, carried out in September and October, caused great unrest among the population and forced more than 300,000 young people to leave the country. And the next mobilization would probably have a similar effect. This social turbulence can greatly reshape internal politics by further strengthening Russian security forces – members of the security services. They have long demanded that the Kremlin eliminate Russia’s remaining freedoms, which they see as risky democratic indulgences. The siloviki advocated the cancellation of last year’s regional elections and insisted that the Kremlin impose a state of emergency and close Russia’s borders.
Their demands were largely ignored: elections were held, the imposition of a state of emergency was only partial, and the borders remained open. But if Russia faces military setbacks and, as a result, social unrest, the position of the siloviki could strengthen. Putin may then find that he has less control over policymaking as security officials may begin to refuse to follow his orders.
Anger is growing among patriots
The military setbacks could also fuel anger among Russia’s “angry patriots”: a term Kremlin political advisers use to describe prominent, pro-war bloggers who publicly criticize and condemn the effectiveness of the Russian military. Some have even criticized Putin himself and threatened not to support him on elections in 2024. They could fill the Russian news space with insults against the military, just as thousands of ordinary Russians are trying to flee the country. Such a dire situation could force the Kremlin to move toward a military dictatorship, with more massive repression, while the state would focus entirely on war, further exacerbating the divide between those who favor escalating the conflict and those who do not.
In a worst-case scenario for Putin, the elites could start to panic about his rule, and the most powerful people in the country could start pushing political agendas different from his from the outside. For example, the leader of the Wagner mercenary group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, is already distancing himself from Putin by accusing Putin’s officials of making serious mistakes. This internal criticism of Putin would not cost the election; It is not difficult for the Kremlin to suppress or eliminate opposition, but the instability could expose Putin to challenges from those closest to him in his regime.
List of possible successors of Putin
Therefore, a re-escalation could trigger two opposing trends. On the one hand, it could cause panic among Russian elites, leading them to fight among themselves and even against the Kremlin. On the other hand, it could force the security forces to succeed in silencing citizens and suppressing discontent. Either way, there could be more arrests, asset seizures and purges in Russia, and Putin could lose some of his power in the process.
Both Western observers and Russian elites like to speculate about who might lead Russia after Putin, and analysts in both camps have compiled a shortlist of possible candidates. They closely followed Putin’s public appearances, especially when he praised or criticized someone. They noted, for example, his recent praise of Agriculture Minister Dmitry Patrushev and his criticism of Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov. They also pay attention to the behavior of various candidates. For example, the incendiary rhetoric of Deputy President of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev is seen by many Russian experts as a sign that Medvedev believes that Putin has chosen him to be the next president of Russia. The same applies to Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Security Council (and the father of the aforementioned Minister Dmitry Patrushev).
But these speculations make no sense. To this day, Putin’s plans have remained taboo even among his closest associates, let alone among other high-ranking officials. No one really knows if Putin will even run for re-election. This created another problem for the elites. Not only is their aging president leading Russia to possible military defeat; it also makes it difficult for them to plan for Russia’s future, and these two problems are closely related. If the military situation worsens, the likelihood that Putin will step down anytime soon decreases, which then increases internal tensions in the country.
He won’t lose power, but he won’t get 77 percent either
Russians are aware that Putin could stay in power for a long time. When members of the elite describe someone as a potential successor to Putin, they often get that person into trouble. (Putin does not look kindly on people seeking to replace him.) Still, if the conflict drags on and Moscow continues its string of setbacks, it’s possible that Russia’s elites could begin to seriously consider choosing a successor. The longer Putin is in power, the harder it will be for him to control the succession process, and if the war further disrupts it, the richest and most powerful Russians will have an opportunity to organize themselves. Especially if Putin becomes indecisive.
All this does not mean that the Russian elites will try to carry out some kind of coup d’état in the near future. For now, Putin reigns supreme, but the war is changing Russia, and Putin’s willingness to invest even more resources to avoid defeat has led him down a risky path, tying his fate to the outcome of an unpredictable conflict. It may not be likely that Putin will lose power, but a historically large re-election victory is by no means guaranteed.
(WORLD)