The challenges of 2023 – Cas Mudde

This year was the fifth crisis of a still young century: after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Great Recession, the so-called refugee crisis and the covid-19 pandemic, 2022 brought the Russian invasion of ‘Ukraine. This fact has provided politicians with the opportunity to declare the pandemic over, despite the still high number of cases, but it has also presented them with new challenges in sectors that they had been trying to ignore or at least depoliticize for decades.

In particular the closely interconnected fields of defense and energy: although they are closely related to the issue of national sovereignty, in the European context they are de facto international issues. And they present Europeans with a very painful reality: despite being the third largest economy in the world, the European Union depends on the United States for defense and on Russia for energy. The war in Ukraine has forced Europe to finally address these key vulnerabilities, which pose a challenge not only for individual countries, but also for the European Union as a whole.

Today most of the world has entered crisis mode. While the European Union has imposed economic sanctions on Russia, Putin and his cronies, much of the rest of the planet, especially the “global south”, has joined the criticism more in words than in deeds. As a result, the sanctions have not had the desired results, which December’s tougher measures hope to remedy. Whatever the outcome, defense and energy will be high on the European agenda in 2023. It is crucial, however, that these challenges are addressed without falling into the illiberal trap.

Defense policy
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has highlighted how Europe continues to depend completely on the United States for military protection. Even in terms of military support for Ukraine, European countries are almost irrelevant. Not only has the US pledged to transfer five times more arms to Ukraine than all European countries combined, but the UK alone has offered more weapons than all EU countries combined . Although President Biden has strengthened the already massive presence of US troops in Europe, the continuation of this dependence on the United States is a (too) risky strategy for Europe.

Donald Trump was an exception, in bluntly criticizing NATO and the scarce financial commitments of its European members, but these sentiments are deeply rooted in the US Republican Party. In keeping with his weak grassroots support, only half of Republicans believe the United States should support Ukraine “for as long as necessary,” and several party officials have criticized Washington’s aid packages to Ukraine.

Now that the party is back in control of the US House of Representatives, it is very likely that it will oppose more actively and effectively what it sees as Biden’s “blank check” approach to Ukraine. However, it is crucial that Europeans understand that “European fatigue” in the United States is a problem for both sides. Joe Biden is a politician from yesteryear, a Cold War veteran who has invested decades of his career in building and strengthening relations between the two sides of the Atlantic.

The current US Democratic Party is much less Eurocentric and represents a multicultural electorate, whose cultural ties are more with Latin America and Asia than with the old continent. Furthermore, for several years China has been seen as the “main threat” to the United States, and this is one of the few bipartisan positions still existing in the country. In fact, Biden has conducted an even more aggressive anti-China campaign than Trump’s in 2020, and his administration has made it clear that it believes China is “the only contender” for global leadership.

In this sense, Russia’s poor military performance in Ukraine has only confirmed Moscow’s status as a minor power in Washington. All of this means that Europe must develop its own military capability, and as soon as possible. Imagine what the Ukrainian war would have been like if there had been a second Trump administration. While this reality is increasingly recognized by European governments, most of the proposed measures are modest at best.

Most countries, for example, have limited themselves to committing themselves to finally complying with NATO’s directive to spend two per cent of their GDP on defence. Olaf Scholz’s promise to include a €100 billion defense fund in the German constitution is a major commitment – ​​even if it is equivalent to about one-eighth of the US defense budget – but Germany will face immense challenges in implementing effectiveness of this fund, especially in the short term.

The European Commission openly acknowledges these “gaps in the defense sector” and “gaps in terms of military capabilities”, but the measures proposed to solve the problems above all confirm the total lack of a defense apparatus in the European Union.

Energy policies
Things are not much better for energy policy. Europe’s dependence on Russian gas is based on a complex set of motivations, some nobler – the environmentalist argument to abandon coal and nuclear power – and others more trivial, such as ease of transport.

Although the updated arguments of the ostpolitik Since the 1990s have lost much of their strength in the face of Putin’s regime, a series of powerful economic interests and short-term political interests have prevented a more radical rethinking of European energy policy. Not even the acknowledgment of the disastrous consequences of this addiction on climate change could change the situation. But the war in Ukraine succeeded.

With around a third of Russia’s gas destined for Europe passing through Ukraine, the Russian invasion has forced all European countries to revise their energy policies. Of course, so far the most dramatic scenarios, such as the implosion of economic output or a “winter of our discontent”, have not materialized, but the reform of energy policies will remain among the priorities for 2023.

In theory, the severity of crises creates the possibility to radically rethink and revise long-term policies and practices. In practice, their (perceived) urgency often creates an incoherent patchwork of hasty and opportunistic policies, lacking a clear, much less alternative vision. This is what has been happening so far to energy politics, or rather to energy policies, in Europe.

The war in Ukraine has led to a “turn towards wind and solar energy”, but the fear of recession has so far limited investment in renewable energy. Moreover, due to decades of underinvestment in renewable energy, increased production can only slightly compensate for the lack of Russian gas. As a result, most European executives are looking for a quick fix, i.e. fossil fuels from other suppliers.

authoritarian drift
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has shifted attention to defense and energy, partially making the issue of authoritarian drift forgotten. Also because Putin is criticized above all for his foreign policy, not for his domestic political regime. But the truth is that in 2022 Europe has become (again) more vulnerable to illiberal thrusts.

With no direct link to the war in Ukraine, Italy was installed as the first far-right-led government in postwar Western Europe, while the Democrats of Sweden became a key coalition partner of the new right-wing government in Sweden.

Contrary to my hopes, Viktor Orbán has used the war in Ukraine through his iron control of the media to convincingly win free but unfair elections in Hungary and strengthen his authoritarian regime. That said, his unreserved advocacy of Russian interests has further marginalized him in Europe, straining his relations with the Law and Justice (PIS) party in Poland.

And while the war in Ukraine has highlighted the dangers of relying on illiberal regimes, the European Union still does not appear to have learned this lesson. As far as energy policy is concerned, Russia is mostly replaced by other autocracies, some with a similar or even worse human rights record than its own, such as Azerbaijan or various Gulf states. Fear of Russian influence now dominates EU relations with the Western Balkans, and could lead the Union to even more unconditional support for the region’s authoritarian leaders.

And if Hungary has been increasingly ostracized for its pro-Putin stance, Poland’s explicit anti-Putin stance has earned it widespread applause. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen was ready to release billions of euros from the Union’s post-pandemic recovery fund in favor of Poland, but the negative political reactions have postponed the manoeuvre, at least for now. And given Warsaw’s ambition to become a “military superpower,” pressure will also mount to ignore Poland’s descent into an increasingly illiberal democracy.

For years, the Union has let economic interests prevail over forms of democracy in Hungary. No sanctions have been adopted against Orbán, because he has had reliable behavior within the European Union, particularly as a member of the European People’s Party (EPP). Today Hungary is an autocracy (in which elections continue to take place) and Orbán has become a major obstacle in the battle against Russia. This should be an important lesson for the Union: the Pis government may be an ally in the war in Ukraine, but it remains an illiberal party, which opposes fundamental European institutions and values. What is convenient today could come back to haunt the European Union tomorrow.

(Translation by Federico Ferrone)